Security Weakness in P25

[DJX]

I found this article while browsing the web:
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1990&context=cis_reports

Interesting stuff, especially about the encryption weaknesses.

 

[GTO_04]

So while they may brag that encrypted P25 systems can't be scanned, they are still very much vulnerable to terrorist attack by jamming, which is relatively easy to do.

GTO_04

 

[mobile1]

I found this article while browsing the web:
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1990&context=cis_reports

Interesting stuff, especially about the encryption weaknesses.

Thanks so much for the link to this information DJX. I use Pro96com to get a vast amounts of information from the P25 control channels and also directly from the portables and mobiles. The site affiliation and other events tabs show the best information. You can see who is around and know how close they are and know when they leave the area. Even when the talkgroups are encrypted you get to see all this information.

 

[mikewazowski]

So while they may brag that encrypted P25 systems can't be scanned, they are still very much vulnerable to terrorist attack by jamming, which is relatively easy to do.

GTO_04

Any system which has an OTA interface can be easily jammed.

The writers tend to point out the flaws in the system but what they don't say is that most of these vulnerabilities exist in other systems as well.

Kind of like saying Ferraris are unsafe when driven on icy roads. Any car is unsafe when driven on an icy road.

The only claims that P25 makes is that the contents of the traffic is safe from eavesdropping.

 

[jackj]

The idea that any Over-The-Air communication is secure is laughable. If you want secure communication then don't broadcast it to anyone and everyone. All it takes to break ANY type of encryption is time and money. If you have enough of both then you can read/listen to any and all communication. But you may not be able to do it in REAL TIME and that is the end goal of P25 encryption. P25 encryption achieves that goal.

 

[mobile1]

P25 Security pdf and much more here.

I found this article while browsing the web:
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1990&context=cis_reports

Interesting stuff, especially about the encryption weaknesses.

Looking for more information on this subject see the P25-security pdf and the other files on this. Go to : www.vk2tvk.org

 

[DJX]

Index of /GNUradio
Looks like you were messing with P25 encryption stuff.
You get any where with that?

 

[mobile1]

Looking for more information on this subject see the P25-security pdf and the other files on this. Go to : www.vk2tvk.org

I found the site with Google. If you take a good look at all the files there you will see that they are using Unitrunker to decode the P25 control channels and that it is located on the Governor Phillip Tower New South Wales Sydney Australia. I think there may be more information on this system in the data base here. This guy maybe a member on this site ? Taking a look in Australia forum now.

 

[Hooligan]

The idea that any Over-The-Air communication is secure is laughable. If you want secure communication then don't broadcast it to anyone and everyone. All it takes to break ANY type of encryption is time and money. If you have enough of both then you can read/listen to any and all communication. But you may not be able to do it in REAL TIME and that is the end goal of P25 encryption. P25 encryption achieves that goal.

I disagree. Strong encryption + a LPI/LPD waveform/channel makes the communication quite secure since unauthorized parties don't even know the communication is taking place, let alone are able to capture the communication, let-alone decode the communication.

Sure, with unlimited time & money, you can get someone to build a time machine & transport you to 30 years from now, where you can buy a computer & bring it back here to 2011, then you can find someone who knows how to write a program to have that computer from 2041 break AES in a couple minutes.

Or with that unlimited money, you can make a 'donation' of a couple billion dollars to the FSB or NSA & maybe they'll try to crack a code for you.

You talk about "P25 encryption," but exactly WHAT encryption format are you referring to? AES is Type I certified for protection of Top-Secret information. Some TS information is just tactically important (that a large air-strike is about to take place), but a lot has a shelf-life of many years, meaning the AES cipher key being broken even a year after the AES-protected transmission reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to US national security despite the secured communication not being decoded in REAL TIME by an unauthorized party. Thus, P-25 AES's goal is far from simply protecting the info from being decoded by an enemy in real or even near-real time.

 

[mobile1]

Looking for more information on this subject see the P25-security pdf and the other files on this. Go to : www.vk2tvk.org

This guy is a member of this site user name is MattSR and vk2tvk is HAM #

 

[gesucks]

AES is Type I certified for protection of Top-Secret information.

AES is Type III not Type I and is not certified for Top-Secret information

 

[DJX]

Either way...I don't think its that important to encrypt traffic stops and speeding.
I see no harm in listening to that.

 

[jackj]

I could be wrong about this Hooligan but from what I've read, P25's encryption key is only 48 bits. A 48 bit key can be brute-forced in a matter of hours using today's top line computers. But if it takes you 6 or 7 hours to retrieve the secret key then the drug raid or stakeout will most likely be over before you are able to read the traffic. If the system generated new keys every 15 minutes then you probably will never be able to read the traffic in real time. The goal of P25's encryption isn't long-term protection, its to keep you and me from reading the traffic in real time.

 

[Hooligan]

AES is Type III not Type I and is not certified for Top-Secret information

AES --with the right implementation of course, is NSA certified for TS info. It's easy to verify it on-line. Not sure if you're wanting to quibble, or are just clueless.

 

[Hooligan]

I could be wrong about this Hooligan but from what I've read, P25's encryption key is only 48 bits. A 48 bit key can be brute-forced in a matter of hours using today's top line computers. But if it takes you 6 or 7 hours to retrieve the secret key then the drug raid or stakeout will most likely be over before you are able to read the traffic. If the system generated new keys every 15 minutes then you probably will never be able to read the traffic in real time. The goal of P25's encryption isn't long-term protection, its to keep you and me from reading the traffic in real time.

Jack,

Again, you keep referring to P25 as encryption. It is not. It is an encoding/decoding & information standard. So *once again* I'll assume you're referring to AES. AES comes in several implementations that offer varying levels of protection. AES-256 is certified by NSA for the protection of Top Secret-level information. AES-128 is the lowest key size I've heard of, and in the USA it is certified by NIST for the protection of sensitive, but unclassified information.

I already responded to your claim that P25 encryption (sic) is only designed to protect info against real or near-real time unauthorized decryption in my prior post.


As the great report referenced in the original post shows, there are vulnerabilities to using a P-25 circuit, with or without encryption. They're all well-known to the people involved with designing comm networks (though as the report pointed out, often not the actual users). But you seem to be fixated on the AES issue without just cause.

 

[Hooligan]

Either way...I don't think its that important to encrypt traffic stops and speeding.
I see no harm in listening to that.

So you're suggesting that a LEA use a non-secure channel for communications regarding civil infractions "traffic stops & speeding," but it'd be OK if they use a secure-channel for misdemeanor & felony crimes in progress?

I understand & agree with what you're getting at, but I think if an LEA already using P-25 wants to protect their radio comms regarding in-progress crimes, it's easier for them to just encrypt the dispatch channel 100% (which would include 'routine' traffic-stop related comms) instead of necessitating officers going back between secure & non-secure modes.


In the days of DVP/DES & speech-inversion, it was different because using those modes had an impact on circuit quality (range/intelligibility) so some agencies would just selectively use secure mode (Austintown Township, Ohio is an example) but these days if they're already using P25, AES itself doesn't have a negative impact on circuit quality.


Getting back to the original report, I think the biggest item of concern is clear-voice override, meaning a hostile party transmitting in P25 non-secure won the right freq & with the right NAC can intrude on the secure net & possibly inject harmful information without being discovered, because the legitimate users, even using secure-mode, will hear that person & quite possibly not recognize him as an intruder. Clear voice override is a 'feature' of Motorola DVP & NIST DES because federal agents were somewhat nervous about the high-tech digital voice stuff not working right & if they were out on the street in a firefight, they wanted to be sure that everyone would hear their SOS call, even if their radio was transmitting in analog mode.

Accidently having your radio in the non-secure mode on what's supposed to be a secure channel/operation is a big threat too, but that can be mitigated by the radios being programmed to only transmit in secure-mode on a channel.

 

[Squad10]

In the days of DVP/DES & speech-inversion, it was different because using those modes had an impact on circuit quality (range/intelligibility) so some agencies would just selectively use secure mode (Austintown Township, Ohio is an example) but these days if they're already using P25, AES itself doesn't have a negative impact on circuit quality.

Only if the agency ordered the Clear/Code board when Motorola Securenet DVP/DES was in its infancy:>}

USPS is an example.

 

[MattSR]

Index of /GNUradio
Looks like you were messing with P25 encryption stuff.
You get any where with that?

We successfully cracked DES-OFB and one other P25 based encryption algorithm that we are yet to release the details on. We have proven that P25 DES-OFB key recovery can be performed in less than a day.

Regards,
Matt
VK2TVK

 

[DJX]

Cool,
I would love to see more details...or even do a little testing myself, if it's possible.

 

[hitechRadio]

Well looks like we should start encrypting the CC as well, that shold make scanner listiners happy. But I think we might be in luck, because I dought system administrator will do that, just for the rason of money. If the CC was encrypted every radio would have to have encryption in them. But they could implement a basic encryption on the CC that doesnot require a secure module.

This Paper is and ovouius attack against p25, hell he goes out of the way to mention his opinioons on design flaws of Motorola subscriber equipment.

As far as im concerned that article is a bunch of bs.

As far as MattsSR, sure ya did. LOL