These videos were real tough to watch. I guess I needed to, but now that I did I regret doing so. One one of the longer videos near the top of the list the dramatic wind shift is shown and it did so in a very short period of time. Just so people understand what they are hearing, Granite Mountain's (hotshot crew) superintendent was reassigned to be Division Alpha and an assistant superintendent, foreman, or captain took over command of the crew. I'm not sure if that is the man who was panicking and shouting, identifying as Granite Mtn. 7, was the person put in charge of the crew.
At one point someone said that the crew was on the southeast side of the fire. They were on walking downhill on what was the southern portion of the west flank, or the southwestern portion of the fire.
Air Attack (Bravo 33) sounds like he was brushing Granite Mountain 7 off and it would seem he doesn't understand the seriousness of the situation. Even though they were copying the radio traffic from the crew no one knew where they were and the thick smoke made trying to get them airdrops in these circumstances would have been difficult. A retardant drop right on them might have saved them, but such accuracy in those visibility conditions would be at best, lucky. If a Very Large Airtanker could have started on that flank of the fire laying down a long drop they might have gotten lucky. If the crew was able to a GPS obtained position and if, a big if, there were some large aircraft in the air, such as a helitanker or an airtanker they may have been able to drop blind and do some good. However, it didn't sound like anything was close enough to help. It looked like a Type II helo with a bucket was overhead in one of the videos.
The difficulty of the investigation is that the reasons that Granite Mountain left their well anchored safety zone on the northwest portion of the fire will never be known. They had to hike with unburned fire on all sides of them and topography prevented them from seeing the fire for an extended time period.
I drove around Yarnell Hill after Christmas in 2013. The lack of any effort to create defensible space was strikingly obvious. Several burned structures had large diameter branches of brush right up to the foundations of homes that were destroyed. I tried to imagine how thick the fuels had been pre fire based on what I was seeing. My imagination underestimate the fuel load.
While in Phoenix for Christmas last year and prior to visiting Yarnell. There was at least one, often 2-4, articles in the Arizona Republic about this fire. There were quotes from homeowners and attorneys representing some of them. There wasn't any mention of the lack of defensible space around the structures. I can't imagine, given the fire awareness in California, after the destruction of multiple structures that homeowner's would be gathering to file a class action suit against the agency in command of the fire. Maybe it happens in southern California and I don't watch the news from there or read the L.A. Times enough to make this statement, but I don't remember a reaction like I observed in Arizona last year.
I know of cases where homes in California were saved because they were covered by retardant drops and the homeowner later filing a claim for the expenses of removing the retardant from the home, a difficult process. You would think the homeowner would be glad they had a home that needed such a cleaning and would bear the cost. Go figure. However, given that defensible space is required by the California Public Resource Code I can't see homeowner's who have ignored such a requirement filing claims.
I hope this fire results in giving the Arizona State Forestry Division (ASFD) more resources and more effective law to get defensible space constructed in areas like Yarnell. The people of the state need to gain more fire awareness.
When I was a fire prevention technician in Arizona in the 1970's we had a very high human caused fire count each year. That count was about a hundred a year on the Kaibab National Forest. Analysing that from a per acre, per visitor, per year basis makes that figure higher than that of the last two National Forests I worked on, the Toiyabe and the Inyo in California. The Inyo is the most visited National Forest in California and usually ends up in the top 5 National Forests in the nation each year. It has a very high proportion of visitors staying overnight, dozens of times greater than the Kaibab NF. Yet the human caused fire count on the Inyo is usually 10-20% that of the Kaibab during my time on that forest.. Visitors were not the only people causing fires, local construction, welding, equipment (timber sales, pulpwood sales, firewood gathering, thinning contracts) and smoking were just as high or higher. If I found a chain saw without the spark arrestor and told people that had to go home and take care of it you would have thought I had poked on of their eyes out with an ice pick. They also became hostile and told me they didn't need to have someone from the government how to put out a fire as they had been doing to so for umpty frump years. This happens everywhere, but the rate at which it happened was higher in Arizona and New Mexico when I worked there.
Was the fire awareness there, pre Yarnell, better than it was when I worked for the Forest Service there in the 70's? I can't answer that question, but I would hope so. Post Yarnell, there is nothing like multiple structure loss to raise awareness, but that usually wears off when time passes. Changing the fire culture in Arizona will take some time and I hope the powers to be will give the ASFD the means to start on the task to do so on state and private land.