I heard it on the scanner in my office...the CP then made it very clear to only "strenghthen" existing fire roads, and cut no new lines per the SMC. It was really going at that point.....I have also heard "no phoscheck" orders turning loaded tankers around on their first run on a couple fires down here....
Interesting. The difference between "demanding no bulldozers be used to cut a fire line" and "cut no new lines per the SMC" is a significant one. I found this quote on a KABC write up, " L.A. City Fire Department says they will need to fight this fire from the air, as the area is inaccessible." If the ridge tops were dozed, which it looks like in the KABC footage, then I wonder how this fire were that "inaccessible."
I've seen dozers used on steep slopes on the Klamath National Forest and they have to cut line up and down a slope, this in huge drainages without nearby ridge tops. Cutting parallel with the contour lines is impossible when the slopes are steep enough. The rehab of dozer line on steep slopes is hugely expensive and is difficult to do successfully. Once soil is disturbed on steep slopes, especially in the unstable soils of the Santa Monica and San Gabriel Mountains, it can open a real can of worms. Dozer use on fires is always carefully evaluated and the decision not to use them is not at all unusual. I could relate some stories in my experience but then I would ramble on like some retired fire dog and no one wants that!
As for retardant turned around, I wonder why that order was given. Could it be because of adjacent research gardens on the grounds of Getty Center? Retardant can result in some nasty effects and can sometimes be grouped into the old "firefighting does more damage than fire did" sort of scenario. I could also speculate that the wind direction and the distance from the 405 may have resulted in safety concerns for the freeway, either by drifting retardant or safety margins for aircraft.
Over the years of responding to and listening on the radio to fires, I learned that there are many decisions made by the command staff that don't make sense until all the information is in. Sometimes that information doesn't get air time or is printed in newspapers even when released by fire information folks due to length of story considerations and the like. I was qualified for and worked a few fires as an information officer and have seen that happen.
Then again there are some situations that the command staff makes that don't make sense even when all the information is in. They are trying to keep up with highly fluid situations with difficulties getting good timely information to base decisions on. Sometimes we tend to take those decisions out of that context and "hindsight 20/20" them to death. I've been on the command staff, in ops, planning, on the line as a crew boss, and have IC'ed a few initial attacks and some small extended attacks. It is amazing how difficult it is to pull it all together.
By the way, environmentalists lobbied for major changes in fire suppression and management policy starting in the 1950's and 1960's when the first comprehensive research about the disaster taking fire out of fire dependent ecosystems was causing and was going to cause. People responded with negative attitudes toward environmentalists then too, mainly from their misinformed "black is bad, green is good" perspective. When I joined the Forest Service in 1974 the "on the ground" fire management personnel I worked with all talked about the need to let fire burn wherever possible in agreement with the policy statements of the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, and the Wilderness Society, among others. No one wanted to heed the warnings and we now have what could have been avoided.