At issue here is if it is legal to connect a scanner to the Internet so that others can listen to local communications. Typically, the public safety communications of police and fire departments are what most people are interested in listening to over the Internet. So it goes with most topics of discussion, there are usually two opposite points of view, each holding to be correct and this topic is no exception. 
I decided to fork this thread from a previous thread to try and compare personal opinions (YEA and NAY) to relevant case law and see what matched up. Essentially, the NAY camp rallies around the legislation found in Title 47, Chapter 5, Subchapter VI, § 605 (a) as it's foundation that scanners connected to the Internet are illegally divulging a radio transmission.
Amongst other things, § 2511 of Chapter 119 authorizes which radio transmissions can be legally intercepted:
On the other hand, the NAY camp, as articulated by N_Jay's post, holds that "The rules regarding "interception" are independent from the rules regarding "divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio communication". Both camps seem to have the correct opinion on the matter, but it is just that ... opinions and conclusions drawn from personal observations and prejudices.
So we are back to the original question of, to what extent does chapter 119, title 18 modify § 605? In order to authoritatively answer this question we need case law.
Ready?
In U.S. v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982), the First Circuit held that Chapter 119 applied to radio communications otherwise protected by 605(a), by virtue of 605(a)'s introductory clause. The court recognized that "the protective shield of 605 is significantly diminished in scope by incorporating the requirements of [Chapter 119]." The court noted, however, that it was significant that Congress simultaneously added 605(a)'s introductory clause when it passed Chapter 119 in 1968. The court cited legislative history which clearly states that "The regulation of the interception of wire or oral communications in the future is to be governed by the proposed new [Title III]." Id.
In Edwards v. State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.1987), the Fifth Circuit held that while the phrase could be interpreted to preface only the first sentence of section 605,. . . "we think the better interpretation limits each of section 605's prohibitions to activities not authorized by the Wiretap Act." Id. at 540. The court went on to note that Under the former interpretation, activity permissible under the Wiretap Act could be prohibited under section 605 of the Communications Act. Since Congress added the introductory phrase to section 605 at the same time that it enacted the Wiretap Act, we believe Congress likely intended to make the same statutes consistent. The latter interpretation has this effect by ensuring that the interception and divulgence of a voice communication transmitted by radio waves is not prohibited by section 605 unless the communication also falls within the protections of the Wiretap Act. . . . [W]e acknowledge that neither the language of section 605 nor the relevant legislative history makes it entirely clear whether Congress intended this result . . .. Id. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the 1986 amendments to the Wiretap Act add much support to that court's conclusion, as these amendments expressly govern voice communication transmitted by radio waves. The court rejected the argument contained in Bruce Fein's law review article that Chapter 119 only applies to the first sentence of 605(a). The court noted that "[e]ven this commentator . . . suggested as an alternative interpretation the one adopted by the First Circuit in Rose." Id. at 540 n.7.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit followed the lead of the First and Fifth Circuits in Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989),cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990), which held that the requirements of Chapter 119 apply to 605.
In U.S. v. Gass, judgment of acquittal, the court mused:
I decided to fork this thread from a previous thread to try and compare personal opinions (YEA and NAY) to relevant case law and see what matched up. Essentially, the NAY camp rallies around the legislation found in Title 47, Chapter 5, Subchapter VI, § 605 (a) as it's foundation that scanners connected to the Internet are illegally divulging a radio transmission.
While that may seem like a fairly easy prohibition to understand, what complicates matters in this discussion is that the "(a)" paragraph of § 605 starts off with:§ 605 (a) said:
What does "chapter 119, title 18" authorize? To what extent does chapter 119, title 18 modify § 605?§ 605 (a) said:
Amongst other things, § 2511 of Chapter 119 authorizes which radio transmissions can be legally intercepted:
This too seems like it should be easy to understand: "It shall not be unlawful .. to intercept any radio communication which is transmitted .. readily accessible to the general public". Applying lawful, authorized activities of § 2511 Chapter 119 back to § 605 paragraph (a)'s exception "Except as authorized by chapter 119, title 18", it would seem (to the YEA camp) that any activity deemed not unlawful in § 2511 Chapter 119 would allow someone to tell/divulge what is heard to anyone and by extension relay it to the Internet.§ 2511 (2) said:
On the other hand, the NAY camp, as articulated by N_Jay's post, holds that "The rules regarding "interception" are independent from the rules regarding "divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio communication". Both camps seem to have the correct opinion on the matter, but it is just that ... opinions and conclusions drawn from personal observations and prejudices.
So we are back to the original question of, to what extent does chapter 119, title 18 modify § 605? In order to authoritatively answer this question we need case law.
Ready?
In U.S. v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982), the First Circuit held that Chapter 119 applied to radio communications otherwise protected by 605(a), by virtue of 605(a)'s introductory clause. The court recognized that "the protective shield of 605 is significantly diminished in scope by incorporating the requirements of [Chapter 119]." The court noted, however, that it was significant that Congress simultaneously added 605(a)'s introductory clause when it passed Chapter 119 in 1968. The court cited legislative history which clearly states that "The regulation of the interception of wire or oral communications in the future is to be governed by the proposed new [Title III]." Id.
In Edwards v. State Farm Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.1987), the Fifth Circuit held that while the phrase could be interpreted to preface only the first sentence of section 605,. . . "we think the better interpretation limits each of section 605's prohibitions to activities not authorized by the Wiretap Act." Id. at 540. The court went on to note that Under the former interpretation, activity permissible under the Wiretap Act could be prohibited under section 605 of the Communications Act. Since Congress added the introductory phrase to section 605 at the same time that it enacted the Wiretap Act, we believe Congress likely intended to make the same statutes consistent. The latter interpretation has this effect by ensuring that the interception and divulgence of a voice communication transmitted by radio waves is not prohibited by section 605 unless the communication also falls within the protections of the Wiretap Act. . . . [W]e acknowledge that neither the language of section 605 nor the relevant legislative history makes it entirely clear whether Congress intended this result . . .. Id. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the 1986 amendments to the Wiretap Act add much support to that court's conclusion, as these amendments expressly govern voice communication transmitted by radio waves. The court rejected the argument contained in Bruce Fein's law review article that Chapter 119 only applies to the first sentence of 605(a). The court noted that "[e]ven this commentator . . . suggested as an alternative interpretation the one adopted by the First Circuit in Rose." Id. at 540 n.7.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit followed the lead of the First and Fifth Circuits in Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989),cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990), which held that the requirements of Chapter 119 apply to 605.
In U.S. v. Gass, judgment of acquittal, the court mused:
Not to be deterred, the government decided to submit a request for a retrial. In denying the government request, the court had more to say on the subject:
This next quote box is actually part of the text of court's comments denying the government's request for a retrial, but it's content is so powerful that I wanted to present it in such a manner so that it stands out.
Finally, the FCC has provided an opinion via email specifically addressing placing scanner audio on the Internet:
Almost finished .. I need to start a new post because 12k charaters is the max allowed per post. (in case you've ever wondered)FCC Consumer Center Response email - Ref# 02777194 said:
