The cause of the Angora Fire has been officially listed as a campfire. This information was released last night at 2000 (8 p.m.) With this I'm sure many will react to this news and say something similar to "THEY (whoever that should be) should not have allowed campfires in that area." This could lead to a bunch of rumors and criticisms that are not at all valid or credible. In reality camping and campfires outside of developed recreation areas have been prohibited on the National Forest lands in the Lake Tahoe Basin yearlong for a number of years. In addition fire restrictions had gone into effect on June 22, 2007, two days before the fire, for the Lake Tahoe Basin Management Unit of the U.S. Forest Service. There was no quick action to close the barn door after the horse had already run out as many folks might start saying.
Now June 22nd might seem too late to some arm chair Monday morning quarterbacks with 20/20 hindsight. Remember that this area of the Sierra and further south received 2" of snow or more in the first week of June. One of the problems with issuing fire restrictions based on long term fuel moistures is the public not understanding why, after a snowstorm or other weather event has just occurred, restrictions are put in place. They don't understand the lag time for drying and wetting the larger fuels and the long term factors that determine the current moisture levels of these fuels. In case after case I observed in my career USFS people have been accused us of "crying wolf" about fire danger and over assessing same. They don't know of or understand the well developed body of science that actually determines fire danger and fuel moisture. The difficulty in using the science is making a informed judgement of public perception and what the long term weather trend might be, so you have to depart from the science and let part of your decision making allow a more "seat of the pants" evaluation as well.
The link to the information on camping and fire restrictions in the Lake Tahoe Management Unit (LTBMU) are available here:
http://www.fs.fed.us/r5/ltbmu/recreation/forest-orders/index.shtml
Click onto the fire restriction order at the top, which is labeled "6-25-07", but has an actual signature date of the Forest Supervisor of 6-22-07. Also click onto the dispersed camping order and read through it. It clearly shows the locations where campfires are prohibited year round and where exceptions are located. The fire restrictions put into effect on June 22nd requires those camping in the exception areas to obtain a permit for a gas stove and prohibits BBQ's and campfires. This is a moot point as the origin of the Angora fire is in a camping/campfire/gas stove restricted area all the time. This order is the current version of ones that have been previously in effect for a decade or two. I remember researching the Forest Orders of nearby National Forests with heavy recreation use when rewriting the one we had on the Bridgeport Ranger District of the Toiyabe National Forest when I transferred there in 1981. The LTBMU's Forest Orders were among those I obtained copies of. Forest Orders now contain a type of "sunset clause" so they will be reviewed for need and content periodically, otherwise there is a possiblity for orders to sit on the shelf and forgotten similar to those stories you hear about laws still on the books where you cannot chew gum in your home during some obscure religious holiday in Cleveland south of the river if your house is painted blue (slight emblishment added for effect!).
The only factor in evaluating the actions of the Forest Service prior to the ignition of the Angora fire, is how these restrictions were being enforced and how the Forest visitor is notified of the restriction. In my opinion the cuts made in the agencies fire management programs and long term trends in employement have probably contributed to a less than optimum performance in fire prevention and fire suppression response. Most engines, even in California, have been cut back to a 5 day week, which, in effect, reduces the number of engines on any given day to about 29% of 7 day coverage. In fire prevention there are so many vacancies in the patrol type postions I am amazed. Supervisory positions such as battallion chiefs and division chiefs (fire managment officers) vacancy rate appears to be higher than anything I can ever remember in my career. The additional factor that my not be obvious is the knowledge level of those people in the positions currently filled is not likely to be as high as it was when most positions were filled and positions were filled far more quickly. It takes time to gain the field sense neccessary to know where and when to be in certain locations where fires are likely to start and take the actions that will prevent fire starts. I know it can be done as I worked for a batt chief on the Kaibab National Forest early in my career who had been a fire prevention tech on the Angeles NF and using the methods he taught me reduced our man caused fire starts by at least 2/3's in the second year (1977, the year of the big drought). While we can't say that better coverage would have prevented this particular fire the chances of reducing human caused igntion go down as people are removed from the field. I speak of these factors in general and don't know the specifics of the LTBMU and their fire prevention program or what engines came from where and their response times to this fire. Just things to think about when looking at the circumstances of the intial attack, which should be covered in an official report some months from now.
Note to moderators: this is not a "Tavern" topic. It is a breaking news story in California which many scanner owners have been listening to. Please don't move it!
Now June 22nd might seem too late to some arm chair Monday morning quarterbacks with 20/20 hindsight. Remember that this area of the Sierra and further south received 2" of snow or more in the first week of June. One of the problems with issuing fire restrictions based on long term fuel moistures is the public not understanding why, after a snowstorm or other weather event has just occurred, restrictions are put in place. They don't understand the lag time for drying and wetting the larger fuels and the long term factors that determine the current moisture levels of these fuels. In case after case I observed in my career USFS people have been accused us of "crying wolf" about fire danger and over assessing same. They don't know of or understand the well developed body of science that actually determines fire danger and fuel moisture. The difficulty in using the science is making a informed judgement of public perception and what the long term weather trend might be, so you have to depart from the science and let part of your decision making allow a more "seat of the pants" evaluation as well.
The link to the information on camping and fire restrictions in the Lake Tahoe Management Unit (LTBMU) are available here:
http://www.fs.fed.us/r5/ltbmu/recreation/forest-orders/index.shtml
Click onto the fire restriction order at the top, which is labeled "6-25-07", but has an actual signature date of the Forest Supervisor of 6-22-07. Also click onto the dispersed camping order and read through it. It clearly shows the locations where campfires are prohibited year round and where exceptions are located. The fire restrictions put into effect on June 22nd requires those camping in the exception areas to obtain a permit for a gas stove and prohibits BBQ's and campfires. This is a moot point as the origin of the Angora fire is in a camping/campfire/gas stove restricted area all the time. This order is the current version of ones that have been previously in effect for a decade or two. I remember researching the Forest Orders of nearby National Forests with heavy recreation use when rewriting the one we had on the Bridgeport Ranger District of the Toiyabe National Forest when I transferred there in 1981. The LTBMU's Forest Orders were among those I obtained copies of. Forest Orders now contain a type of "sunset clause" so they will be reviewed for need and content periodically, otherwise there is a possiblity for orders to sit on the shelf and forgotten similar to those stories you hear about laws still on the books where you cannot chew gum in your home during some obscure religious holiday in Cleveland south of the river if your house is painted blue (slight emblishment added for effect!).
The only factor in evaluating the actions of the Forest Service prior to the ignition of the Angora fire, is how these restrictions were being enforced and how the Forest visitor is notified of the restriction. In my opinion the cuts made in the agencies fire management programs and long term trends in employement have probably contributed to a less than optimum performance in fire prevention and fire suppression response. Most engines, even in California, have been cut back to a 5 day week, which, in effect, reduces the number of engines on any given day to about 29% of 7 day coverage. In fire prevention there are so many vacancies in the patrol type postions I am amazed. Supervisory positions such as battallion chiefs and division chiefs (fire managment officers) vacancy rate appears to be higher than anything I can ever remember in my career. The additional factor that my not be obvious is the knowledge level of those people in the positions currently filled is not likely to be as high as it was when most positions were filled and positions were filled far more quickly. It takes time to gain the field sense neccessary to know where and when to be in certain locations where fires are likely to start and take the actions that will prevent fire starts. I know it can be done as I worked for a batt chief on the Kaibab National Forest early in my career who had been a fire prevention tech on the Angeles NF and using the methods he taught me reduced our man caused fire starts by at least 2/3's in the second year (1977, the year of the big drought). While we can't say that better coverage would have prevented this particular fire the chances of reducing human caused igntion go down as people are removed from the field. I speak of these factors in general and don't know the specifics of the LTBMU and their fire prevention program or what engines came from where and their response times to this fire. Just things to think about when looking at the circumstances of the intial attack, which should be covered in an official report some months from now.
Note to moderators: this is not a "Tavern" topic. It is a breaking news story in California which many scanner owners have been listening to. Please don't move it!
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