EDACS ESK

[marcp90]

I have seen many references to ESK for EDACS. What is that?

 

[scannerfreak]

ESK= EDACS Security Key


It is a security code or "key" required to track the control channel. It is programmed into the radios. When in use you cannot track or follow an EDACS control channel. You can, however, still monitor analog communications conventionally.

 

[chrisjz]

Out of the radio business. Deleted...

 

[crayon]

.. M/A-COM is working on a DES encrypted version that would require the use of a DES key which can not be cracked easily and would render trunk trackers useless once again.

Lovely.

 

[SCPD]

I wish they would work on a version that leaves the outbound control channel alone and encrypts the inbound signaling from the radios.

That way they would keep unauthorized radios off the system (one of the other main goals of ESK), agencies could encrypt the extra sensitive talk groups, but the rest could be open. Then everyone is happy.

This deal where they want to kill everything at once by encrypting the outbound stuff sucks.

What they should have done years ago, is have every radio have it's own unique electronic serial number (ESN), like cell phones do. They should authenticate on that. That way system owners would only activate the ESNs that they wanted on the system. That would keep any idiots from transmitting on a system they don't belong on.

 

[scannerfreak]

From M/A COM's Web Site about ESK:

http://www.macom-wireless.com/news/pressdetail.asp?id=35

Security is a crucial feature of any critical communications system as any security breach on a system compromises its effectiveness and that of the public safety professionals that rely on it. EDACS Security Key (ESK) addresses this need through several unique features:

• ESK allows each customer to define a unique security code that is programmed into the radio products and site equipment. During normal operation, if the code stored in the radio and site do not match, the radio will not receive calls from or transmit calls to that particular site

• ESK prevents trunked radio scanners from monitoring radio traffic on an EDACS site

• ESK offers restricted access to radio programming. Once a radio has been programmed with an ESK security code, that radio cannot be read or altered unless the specific code is provided by the user.

Seems to me there are deliberately going after scanner users..

 

[N_Jay]

From M/A COM's Web Site about ESK:

http://www.macom-wireless.com/news/pressdetail.asp?id=35

Security is a crucial feature of any critical communications system as any security breach on a system compromises its effectiveness and that of the public safety professionals that rely on it. EDACS Security Key (ESK) addresses this need through several unique features:

• ESK allows each customer to define a unique security code that is programmed into the radio products and site equipment. During normal operation, if the code stored in the radio and site do not match, the radio will not receive calls from or transmit calls to that particular site

• ESK prevents trunked radio scanners from monitoring radio traffic on an EDACS site

• ESK offers restricted access to radio programming. Once a radio has been programmed with an ESK security code, that radio cannot be read or altered unless the specific code is provided by the user.

Seems to me there are deliberately going after scanner users..

Of course they are, along with other system security issues.

There is no advantage to having the system open (except to the people here)

 

[scannerfreak]

My point exactly..

 

[SCPD]

There is no advantage to having the system open (except to the people here)

Probably true, but it's still what I WISH they would do.

One thing that might prove interesting is the fact that encrypting/decrypting requires processor time. The current ESK just changes a few things around in the forward data stream. It's just a "different" control channel, not a truely encrypted one.

But using DES requires that the data bits actually be reassembled based on a key (of a certain length). This may slow down channel assignment (and other) messages. They used to brag about how fast a channel could be assigned with EDACS. Maybe it's not an issue with today's fast processors, but it would seem that it would have to slow things down somewhat.

 

[UPMan]

There is no advantage to having the system open (except to the people here)

Add to the "people here":

• Off-duty first responders
  Neighboring community public safety (as adjunct to two-way radios, where only monitoring is needed)
  Media
  Auxiliary "secondary" responders such as RACES, Red Cross, etc

While all of these groups can theoretically be equipped with either personal HT's or with transmit disabled HT's, the cost delta between a scanner and an HT is usually on the order of 500-1000%.

 

[N_Jay]

There is no advantage to having the system open (except to the people here)

Add to the "people here":

• Off-duty first responders
  Neighboring community public safety (as adjunct to two-way radios, where only monitoring is needed)
  Media
  Auxiliary "secondary" responders such as RACES, Red Cross, etc

While all of these groups can theoretically be equipped with either personal HT's or with transmit disabled HT's, the cost delta between a scanner and an HT is usually on the order of 500-1000%.

I guess ALL these good reasons do not add up to be worth more than the good reasons it is that way it is designed?

 

[SCPD]

I have seen many references to ESK for EDACS. What is that?

The key does little to improve security on a system. The only reason it prevents consumer scanners from monitoring an ESK enabled system is because consumer scanners don't understand the subtle change in control channel structure introduced by the ESK option.

To give you an idea of the degree of security, ESK is comparable to a computer network where the password consists of a single letter.

The real purpose of ESK is to prevent foreign radios (by foreign, I mean radios that don't belong on that system) from accidentally affiliating with a system that happens to have the same system id and common control channel as another distant EDACS system. In other words, it's a band-aid for a flaw in EDACS.

-rick

 

[chrisjz]

Out of the radio business. Deleted...

 

[blantonl]

In other words, it's a band-aid for a flaw in EDACS.

I think describing ESK in this fashion is completely wrong. There were before ESK and still are several ways to have many distant EDACS systems operate together without interfering with each other. The main way to do it is to "color" the system. You can assign a color in the programming of an EDACS system and radios to separate two systems with common frequencies. For example, if 2 systems have a common control channel, you can have system A be black and system B be green. Radios from the green system will never see the black and vice versa. ESK is exactly what it was designed and being re-designed to DES for, to keep scanner listeners and unauthorized radios (EBAY radios, etc.) out.

Uh huh... sure.

Tell that to San Antonio and Corpus Christi...

 

[DaveNF2G]

Uh huh... sure.

Tell that to San Antonio and Corpus Christi...

That's why these flawed and over-designed systems are being purchased. The sales reps are telling city officials who know nothing about radio communications or technology all sorts of garbage, and they lack the expertise to see through it.

73 de Dave, NF2G

 

[SCPD]

There were before ESK and still are several ways to have many distant EDACS systems operate together without interfering with each other.

Here's an actual example where that doesn't work. Consider two systems that are far enough apart that interference isn't an issue. I'm thinking of a Ft. Hood area EDACS system and an electric public utility EDACS system. Soldiers from Ft. Hood (presumably on leave) would drive in range of the public ultility's system. Their radios would affiliate with this distant system. ESK fixes this problem.

The real issue is that EDACS doesn't have a system identity AND a site identity like Motorola and Project 25. An EDACS "system id" is only 6 bits - that's 64 possible ids ... the chance of two systems using the same id is just too high.

Compare this to the 16 bit system id for Motorola or 12 bit system id for Project 25. That's 65536 and 4096 possible IDs respectively (and P25 also has a 20 bit WACN so P25 systems effectively have a 32 bit long identity - that's 4 billion possible ID values).

-rick

 

[chrisjz]

Out of the radio business. Deleted...

 

[12VoltInstaller]

Is ESK really worth it

After reading and reading and reading and.. well you get the idea, it looks like ESK has caused more problems in some systems than it is worth as far as dollar wise. I read the quote from MA-COM that someone had posted above and ESK is not needed to keep scanners out, ProVoice does the job just fine. Seeing as how there is not a scanner alive that can figure out what the ProVoice control channel is saying. To me its over kill and it just cost the tax payers (I think thats us) more money. Really by the city trying to force the ESK into the system it has taken the chance of leaving an officer unarmed. If while they are trying to force this thing in for two days and its causeing problems with tx/rx of radios and MD? whatevers this could leave an officer without backup. And running around in circles trying to get your radio to pick up signal kindof might make you look like your crazy. The other things is, how well informed are the people that are making the decision on trying to force this thing in? I dont know I wish we had a say so or an opinion tha could be voiced. Are we the only ones who know about the problems and possible solutins? What about the rest of the tax payers that probably dont even know how much money has been spent on this system so far. Now with all the problems has it made the price go up?

Just my thoughts....Would love to hear yours.

 

[SCPD]

"ESK is not needed to keep scanners out, ProVoice does the job just fine."

True, but we all know if there is a ProVoice system in the area that is NOT ESK, we run to buy the software thru M/A Com,buy a ProVoice radio on ebay, and there we go. Legal, and very easy. ESK prevents that from occuring. Rather or not this was M/A Coms REAL intention is unknown since you really cant beleive what a M/A Com salesman is saying to be true,all he wants is to make the sale. Only the inventor knows its true purpose.

 

[Forts]

"ESK is not needed to keep scanners out, ProVoice does the job just fine."

True, but we all know if there is a ProVoice system in the area that is NOT ESK, we run to buy the software thru M/A Com,buy a ProVoice radio on ebay, and there we go. Legal, and very easy. ESK prevents that from occuring. Rather or not this was M/A Coms REAL intention is unknown since you really cant beleive what a M/A Com salesman is saying to be true,all he wants is to make the sale. Only the inventor knows its true purpose.

And encryption solves that problem pretty quick!!

I'm also not too sure how 'legal' it is, but I hear what you are saying...