Encryption Interoperability on MPSCS; Moratorium on all new encryption programming on the MPSCS until further notice.

[rivermersey]

January 9, 2020

Attn:

Michigan Public Safety Agencies Michigan Public Safety Fraternal Organizations Michigan 9-1-1 Community Michigan Emergency Managers​

Re: Encryption Interoperability on Michigan’s Public Safety Communications System



To All Those Concerned and/or Affected,


The Michigan Public Safety Communications Interoperability Board (MPSCIB) in conjunction with the Office of Michigan’s Public Safety Communications System (MPSCS) collaborates with Michigan’s public safety partners, to provide and promote statewide communications and interoperability across all platforms. It also adopts procedures and best practices to oversee the organization and operations of public safety communications and interoperability throughout Michigan. The Board is responsible for advising the Governor on all interoperability aspects within the emergency communications ecosystem to ensure the public safety community is leveraging available technology both today and in the future.


As most of you may be aware, encryption has been implemented in various communities across the State of Michigan in multiple configurations with varying degrees of success. Through this adoption, it has become clear to the MPSCIB that greater planning and oversight is necessary to ensure the integrity of public safety interoperable communications across disciplines and geographical coverage areas for mutual aid efforts. The non-standardized implementation of encryption across Michigan has demonstrated the risk to public safety due to the loss of interoperability between responding agencies. The MPSCIB cannot stand by actionless and thus issued a moratorium on December 10, 2019 on all new encryption programming on the MPSCS until further notice.


The MPSCIB is requesting comment on the two attached policies by February 19, 2020 for discussion at either the March 10, 2020 or a specially called MPSCIB meeting for the purpose of this continued discussion. Comments can be sent to JannerethK@michigan.gov. Please reference the board approved Encryption Recommendations and Best Practices document prior to responding. To read current encryption discussion by the MPSCIB, please see the Board’s minutes dating back to February 19, 2019.


For your further consideration, AES 256 encryption is the P25 Standard and to qualify for federal grants, a device must be P25 compliant.



Sincerely,

Lieutenant Colonel W. Thomas Sands, Chair Deputy Director Michigan State Police	Mr. Bradley A. Stoddard, Vice-Chair Statewide Interoperability Coordinator Michigan's Public Safety Communications System Department of Technology, Management & Budget

 

[szron]

Long overdue.

Props to the board for tackling this issue. As to how it's gonna play out, we will see.

For forum members here that work at Public Safety agencies, either comment or have your executive comment on those policies. This is importnat stuff.

 

[Forts]

So what is their main concern here... the issue of how to handle encrypted and non-encrypted agencies working together? Or different agencies using different algos? Little bit of both?

 

[wa8pyr]

So what is their main concern here... the issue of how to handle encrypted and non-encrypted agencies working together? Or different agencies using different algos? Little bit of both?

I think what's been happening is agencies plunging ahead with encryption without a real plan, using any old flavor of encryption (I suspect ADP since it comes with many radios at no charge) and putting it on everything in their radios, including statewide and regional interoperability talkgroups, which pretty much kills interoperability.

Appears what they're after is to establish a common procedure statewide, requiring agencies to plan carefully so that local, regional and statewide interoperability is preserved, including the ability for neighboring agencies (and the public, although this isn't mentioned) can monitor day-to-day operations. To me this looks like a reasonable and well thought-out plan.

 

[kayn1n32008]

Someone’s finally figured out that CKR’s and the type of encryption employed need to be coordinated?

 

[Forts]

That certainly would make sense. I guess I assumed when a city/county etc flipped the switch it was a process that had been approved by someone higher up the MPSCS food chain and was all coordinated.

 

[KevinC]

Someone’s finally figured out that CKR’s and the type of encryption employed need to be coordinated?

So you're saying everyone can't use CKR 1?

 

[szron]

So what is their main concern here... the issue of how to handle encrypted and non-encrypted agencies working together? Or different agencies using different algos? Little bit of both?

Using existing CKR, not coordinating keys with surrounding agencies. Different algos between agencies that need to talk to each other.

Basically a lot of agencies are doing their own thing without thinking about wide effects.

MPSCS had a hands off approach and it got really bad, especially with recent changes.

 

[PrivatelyJeff]

I would say there should be no encryption on nationwide interops, then either no encryption on the state ones, OR you can have it but you must use state supplied keys and for neighboring counties, sort it out yourself but it’s on you if you screw up.

 

[Thunderknight]

I would say there should be no encryption on nationwide interops,

The FCC requires the use of analog on the VHF, UHF and 800 national interops, so that practically limits them to clear. (Since there is really no vendor-agnostic analog encryption).
Also by the FCC rules, the 7CALLs have to be in the clear, but the 7TACs (etc) can be encrypted with AES.

 

[slicerwizard]

So what is their main concern here... the issue of how to handle encrypted and non-encrypted agencies working together? Or different agencies using different algos? Little bit of both?

Smells to me like they want ADP to GTFO.

 

[kayn1n32008]

Smells to me like they want ADP to GTFO.

With so many agencies using the system the operators will have to coordinate CKR’s due to the finite number of CKR’s available. Especially if agencies are sharing keys with They interop with. Same with encrypted interop talkgroups. What a cluster f*ck to try and do this after encryption is already I use.

 

[zerg901]

thousands of Michigan cops will die during this moratorium because we know how vital encryption is for occifer safety

keyword - openness

 

[mmckenna]

Page 46 of the latest edition of Mission Critical Communications Magazine explains it well, straight from the director of MPSCS.

 

[rivermersey]

Thank you for this article !!

 

[gpp10x]

I'm a little surprised Eaton County has encrypted some of their TG's with this moratorium in place. The interesting thing to see will be when Oakland County comes online since they are supposed to be/going to be 100% encrypted & how interroperabilty with play out with the surrounding counties.

 

[kayn1n32008]

The interesting thing to see will be when Oakland County comes online since they are supposed to be/going to be 100% encrypted & how interroperabilty with play out with the surrounding counties.

If the agencies can check their ego’s at the door, then encrypted interop will be no issue, and will be achieved, only scanners won’t be able to listen.

Ultimately, if interop talk groups are like the system here, there is a mandate for NO encryption on them.

Hopefully the network operator just mandates that any encryption used must be AES, and starts requiring CKR coordination in order to use encryption on the system.

Locally to me, 2 police agencies, both encrypted, do simulselect(Harris infrastructure) patching between dispatch talk groups so they can communicate encrypted, rather than going to an unencrypted interop talkgroup.

These agencies are aware they use to be monitored when they were analogue.

 

[KK4JUG]

Deleted

 

[mancow]

This is an issue where I'm at. Welfare single key APX1500s stuck with ADP only create islands of non interoperable users.