Radios taken by Taliban

[natedawg1604]

So recently I was reading a chart depicting all the various U.S. military assets taken by the Taliban. On the list was 165,000 radios. Whatever the specific number is, assuming these are Harris Falcon III models (as an example), will the Taliban be able to use them for their own purposes in any type of secure mode?

Obviously the US military can change encryption keys of their own radios, but will the Taliban be able to continue using this stuff themselves for their own uses? I've never served in the military, but from what I understand a lot of these radios are used on small localized networks, and it may be difficult to send remote inhibit commands if they aren't linked to a repeater or network of some type.

 

[BeltramiCountyScanPage]

Im sure the repeaters came home with them, I hope so anyway!

 

[GTR8000]

Assuming the programming was not wiped, and the radios contain AES-256 simplex frequencies...the obvious answer is "yes, they can use them".

 

[Randyk4661]

I've seen this list. I think it's a fake.
This list was too detailed as to numbers of each item left behind. Would the military and the U.S. government want the the public (much less the Taliban) to know what and how much equipment was left behind?
Now if it is true, much of the equipment was disabled before we left. A guess of mine is that this equipment was damaged or destroyed during the pass 20 years of being there and we were leaving our trash behind. Another idea is these items were cannibalized to repair other items and again is just trash.

 

[Thunderknight]

That seems like a way too high of a number (165,000). A quick Google shows at the peak 10 years ago, we had over 100,000 soldiers there. But it's hard to imagine that each solider left their radio behind (or even a larger number spread over a period of time that added up to 165,000).

There were stories in the news about destroying or permanently disabling stuff being left behind. I would think, at the very least, any existing programming and keys would be wiped. They may have even removed/destroyed the crypo hardware (just a guess). Even as far back as WW2 era, they had self destruct built into secret equipment (e.g. push both buttons to destroy). E.g. IFF Radio Destruct Switch Box BC-765 WW2; B-17, B-24, B-29

 

[PrivatelyJeff]

That seems like a way too high of a number (165,000). A quick Google shows at the peak 10 years ago, we had over 100,000 soldiers there. But it's hard to imagine that each solider left their radio behind (or even a larger number spread over a period of time that added up to 165,000).

‘Plus I don’t think everyone got a personal radio anyway. I would imagine you checked them in and out from someone for missions.

 

[chief21]

I would assume that the US provided many, many radios to the Afghan military and National police. I would further assume that said radios were fully functional when the Afghan soldiers and National police just "melted away" as the Taliban approached.

 

[TDR-94]

So recently I was reading a chart depicting all the various U.S. military assets taken by the Taliban. On the list was 165,000 radios. Whatever the specific number is, assuming these are Harris Falcon III models (as an example), will the Taliban be able to use them for their own purposes in any type of secure mode?

Obviously the US military can change encryption keys of their own radios, but will the Taliban be able to continue using this stuff themselves for their own uses? I've never served in the military, but from what I understand a lot of these radios are used on small localized networks, and it may be difficult to send remote inhibit commands if they aren't linked to a repeater or network of some type.

It depends on the radios. The L3HARRIS PRC-152's can utilize many different waveforms. SINCGARS, Havequick, HPW, SATCOM and self healing Ad-Hoc capabilities to name a few.Other than Havequick, these waveforms pretty much all require type 1/Suite A ViNSON suite of crypto algorithm keys be loaded before they can even be used properly in combat opeorations .

Type 2/CNSA, formally known as Suite B, encryption algorithms, like AES, can not be used with any of those waveforms. AES encryption capability in those radios is primarily for allowing secure interoperability with non-CCI compliant radios,

The PRC-152 also has OTAR capabilities.

If the military did indeed leave behind fully intact and operational PRC-152's and other types of radios with similar capabilities, that were not zeroized, then it's possible that they could be utilized by the Taliban for a brief amount of time, with some waveforms, before the encryption keys are completely changed.

As far as using them to communicate with each other, they would have to consistently maintain the HUB's for those keys, that would already be loaded in the radios for them to stay in the radios, to still operate in most of those modes at all. Otherwise, non-secure, single channel/simplex, VHF/UHF line of sight communications would be pretty much all they could utilize.

 

[littona]

It's way too easy to zeroize a radio. Just turn the knob. But the radios that were given to the ANA... that's another story. Typically foreign military sales transactions don't allow the same level of encryption as what the US Military uses. So while they may have workable radios with encryption, they can't load our encryption keys.

 

[TDR-94]

I would assume that the US provided many, many radios to the Afghan military and National police. I would further assume that said radios were fully functional when the Afghan soldiers and National police just "melted away" as the Taliban approached.

The ANA was provided with many L3HARRIS RF-7850V-HH or RF-7850M-HH radios and probably the vehicle mount radios, which are non-CCI export variants.

I'm sure those are in the Talibans hands. They are capable of secure operation utilizing L3HARRIS's own exportable 128/256 bit CITADEL crypto or AES 256.

However, those radios don't support any Type 1/Suite A encryption algorithms or all the same waveforms .

 

[ladn]

It will be interesting to watch e-bay to see if there is a sudden spike in PRC-152 availability.

 

[mancow]

The ANA was provided with many L3HARRIS RF-7850V-HH or RF-7850M-HH radios and probably the vehicle mount radios, which are non-CCI export variants.

I'm sure those are in the Talibans hands. They are capable of secure operation utilizing L3HARRIS's own exportable 128/256 bit CITADEL crypto or AES 256.

However, those radios don't support any Type 1/Suite A encryption algorithms or all the same waveforms .

The necessity of Type 1 over AES256 logically leads one to the conclustion that AES256 is not really "secure" afterall.

 

[PrivatelyJeff]

It will be interesting to watch e-bay to see if there is a sudden spike in PRC-152 availability.

I wonder if buying one would classify me as providing material support to a terrorist organization.

 

[TDR-94]

The necessity of Type 1 over AES256 logically leads one to the conclustion that AES256 is not really "secure" afterall.

Nothing is "truly" secure.AES 256 is certified up to top secret.

Part of the main advantage of the VINSON suite of Type 1 crypto algorithms, is that how they work is not publically known. The "security through obscurity" approach.

99% of how AES 256 works is publically known and NSA still considers it secure up to top secret.

I wonder if buying one would classify me as providing material support to a terrorist organization.

You would be purchasing stolen goverment property and possibly be playing Russian roulette with your freedom. I wouldn't doubt they'd try to throw on extra charges to make an example out of you!

And if you were unlucky enough to purchase one that was still keyed, you would be charged with stealing classified government property.

When the radio is keyed it takes on the classification of the key. All Type 1/Suite A crypto keys are classified material.

 

[N9PBD]

AES 256 is


You would be purchasing stolen goverment property and possibly be playing Russian roulette with your freedom. I wouldn't doubt they'd try to throw on extra charges to make an example out of you!

If the Government abandoned the equipment in place, how would purchasing it be receiving stolen property?

I can see it running afoul of the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. app. 16); Sections 2779 and 2780 of title 22, United States Code (relating to fees of military sales agents and other payments, and transactions with countries supporting acts of international terrorism); Section 542 of title 18, United States Code (relating to the entry of goods by means of false statements), where the underlying offense involves a defense article, including technical data, or violations related to the Arms Export Control Act or International Traffic in Arms Regulations; Section 545 of title 18, United States Code (relating to smuggling goods into the United States), where the underlying offense involves a defense article, including technical data, or violations related to the Arms Export Control Act or International Traffic in Arms Regulations; and Section 554 of title 18, United States Code (relating to smuggling goods from the United States), where the underlying offense involves a defense article, including technical data, or violations related to the Arms Export Control Act or International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

I'm sure there are plenty more punitive laws that would apply, so I agree with @TDR-94 in principal, you would be taking a very big chance with your liberty by purchasing "abandoned, surplus, etc." military equipment from foreign actors.

 

[TDR-94]

"Stolen" may not be the absolute correct term.

Could you prove it was abandoned?

 

[PrivatelyJeff]

"Stolen" may not be the absolute correct term.

Could you prove it was abandoned?

Or what if it was legally the property of the Afghan government and they abandoned it?

 

[prcguy]

I can't imagine any Type 1 encryption radios left behind by US forces and if there were the key loader for that certainly would not be abandoned. Most Harris Falcon II and III radios have lower grade encryption and frequency hopping that can be keyloaded from the radio keypad, so captured radios can be used with some encryption or hopping. Some Thales radios can be keyloaded for DES or AES from the programming software which is easy to get.

As for any captured radios showing up on Ebay, a US Govt model would usually have Type 1 encryption with a CCI tag somewhere on the radio and that would be a fed flag not to buy it as it would have a paper trail and be subject to confiscation at any time, even months after you buy it. Lots of radio equipment was given to Afgan forces and written off by the US then abandoned as the Afgan army ran way and in my opinion if that shows up on Ebay its a free for all and I can't imagine getting in trouble for that.

 

[TDR-94]

Like prcguy said, if it's the abandoned non-CCI, export radios, like the RF-7850's, then that really shouldn't be an issue.

You can buy those from L3HARRIS, if you have roughly the five figures to purchase one!

It's the CCI stuff you are gambling with.

 

[drdispatch]

I saw a video recently of a soldier using an axe to render several pieces of radio gear "inoperable".
I saw this video on the internet, so I cannot/will not vouch for its authenticity.
But presuming that we knew that the equipment was to be left behind, certainly it would meet the fate (or a similar one) shown in said video.

Now, could the Taliban collect enough pieces/parts to get a working radio or two, or three? Maybe. But that assumes that the technical knowledge exists to do that. Maybe it does, maybe it doesn't.

Personally, I'm more concerned about the stuff we gave to the ANA and National Police, which is no doubt still 100% operational, and most likely includes instructional material in the native language.