NTSB Report on Lawrence Gas Explosions - major radio issues

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https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PAR1902.pdf

from page 54 and 55 of 73

Each fire department had one radio channel for intradepartmental communications. In addition, some fire departments had radios capable of interdepartmental communications, allowing direct communications with other fire departments during the emergency response. ICs from each of the three municipalities reported to NTSB investigators that there was a high volume of “chatter” on the radio due to many responders and agencies using the single interdepartmental channel, making it difficult to understand and exchange information. NTSB investigators were told that the mix of radios used by the responding departments also created challenges because not all radios were interoperable. As a result, not all fire departments could directly access other departments.

When the 15 task forces were activated across the state, additional communication resources were included. On September 13, Communication unit leaders were sent to the overpressure accident. Communication unit leaders are responsible for developing communications plans in accordance with the Massachusetts Tactical Channel plan and assessing what resources are needed to maintain communications during an accident. Communication plans were developed for the Merrimack Valley natural gas accident through the operational period from September 13 through September 16. However, the first communication plan was not implemented until around 7:05 p.m., 3 hours after the fires began. Local fire departments needed additional tactical radio channels within the first 2 hours of the accident, when most emergency calls were made. The NTSB NTSB concludes that the field radio communications used across fire departments on September 13 lacked adequate interoperability and availability to ensure that emergency responders had efficient means of interdepartmental and intradepartmental communications.

Statewide Communications Interoperability Plans (SCIP) are comprehensive plans to enhance and maintain emergency communications between multiple jurisdictions in the event of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters. Massachusetts issued its first SCIP in 2007 and noted that home rule poses challenges to radio interoperability because towns were given the authority to determine their own needs (Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2015). The SCIP identified six critical strategic initiatives that Massachusetts needed to put into place to achieve optimum communications interoperability, including the development of funding sources to support the program. The northeast region of Massachusetts, including Merrimack Valley, does have a regional communications system, but the SCIP suggested that the region needed greater interoperability and moment-to-moment sharing of information.

Massachusetts’ SCIP was last updated in 2015 and outlined a multi-jurisdictional and multidisciplinary statewide strategic plan to enhance interoperable and emergency communications. The purpose of the updated SCIP was to provide a strategic plan for directing and aligning resources for interoperable and emergency communications at both state and local levels, as well as expanding existing systems for voice communications for sufficient capacity and coverage for first responders. The plan discusses critical elements to achieve successful interoperable communications such as developing standard operating procedures and upgrading technology. However, no guidance is provided on how to coordinate and implement a plan for emergency responders to effectively communicate during a multi-jurisdictional incident. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed “how-to” guides to assist state and local governments in developing effective hazard mitigation planning. This guidance helps local governments develop and implement multi-jurisdictional hazard mitigation plans to help assess and identify vulnerabilities within and across communities and formulate strategies to mitigate the consequences of such events (FEMA 2006).

The communications difficulties experienced by emergency responders in the multi-jurisdictional response to the overpressurization indicate that communications interoperability is still a problem in Massachusetts, despite the communication resources available to local jurisdictions, as outlined in the 2015 SCIP. The NTSB concludes that the communications issues during the September 13 overpressurization illustrate the need for emergency planning for a multi-jurisdictional response. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security develop guidance that includes a component for effective communications when deploying mutual aid resources within the first hours of a multi-jurisdictional incident.
 
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