All encrypted by 2025??

[MTS2000des]

Encrypted control channel, like LLA, sounds great on paper and in a command staff meeting. For a "new" system with 100 percent "new" subscribers and zero need for cross-programming or I/O with other agencies, HELL YES. Gone are the "ID 1" showing up on Zone Watch, gone are the duplicate IDs from YouTube teknishuns and their cobbled together Ebay radios. Now back to reality. Not likely to be a widespread practice.

 

[KC2CQD]

Baofeng for Public Safety... Umm uhh huh okay. Sure, why not use ccr that has spurious emissions and multitudes of other issues and is not certified for public service use. What could go wrong?

I didn't buy them, they were left behind by the prior Captain.... There's a back story to some of our equipment issues that I wont get into here.
They were the little model 88, 8 channel pocket walkies.
Trust me though, I understand the CCR issues.
We did manage to find refurb XTS1500s that county was able to code plug for us.

 

[radionx]

Wow, I took a look at the Harris XL Series.
Anyone ever audited the baseband processors in those devices? (LTE, WLAN, Bluetooth)

I work with Fire & Civil Defense and we have to instruct people there.
I live by "3 channels and a volume knob, good loudspeaker with 3W output (sound has to be verified by users)" there. "No display" absolutely preferred. If you have to program 3000 TGs in a single radio you are doing IT wrong (means: organisation is bad)

Encrypted control channel: Rather strong authentication of joined devices with certificates.
Otherwise you are kind of creating a new encryption domain (Like a GTK in WLAN)
As for encryption: If I had to implement it - OTAR only. It's not "manageable" and/or secure otherwise.

Encryption won't save from a government whose EROI is getting negative, if you know what I mean. The foe might already be inside.

I look at it from a tactical side. Encryption won't save from what's already on the horizon.

 

[INDY72]

Wow, I took a look at the Harris XL Series.
Anyone ever audited the baseband processors in those devices? (LTE, WLAN, Bluetooth)

I work with Fire & Civil Defense and we have to instruct people there.
I live by "3 channels and a volume knob, good loudspeaker with 3W output (sound has to be verified by users)" there. "No display" absolutely preferred. If you have to program 3000 TGs in a single radio you are doing IT wrong (means: organisation is bad)

Encrypted control channel: Rather strong authentication of joined devices with certificates.
Otherwise you are kind of creating a new encryption domain (Like a GTK in WLAN)
As for encryption: If I had to implement it - OTAR only. It's not "manageable" and/or secure otherwise.

Encryption won't save from a government whose EROI is getting negative, if you know what I mean. The foe might already be inside.

I look at it from a tactical side. Encryption won't save from what's already on the horizon.

3 CH .... If you ever were in a major metro you just shot yourself in the foot. Just 3 CH.. Fine for a tiny podunk nowhereville that will ONLY need to work with itself and NEVER do mutual aid, or have an big event. In a city like Indianapolis, where there are MANY fire/EMS stations in just the city, not to mention that the ENTIRE County is under one big umbrella,.. AND all the surrounding areas all work together in mutual aid situations using a total of 5 TRS's, that 3 CH goes right in the trash. Having to program 3000 TG's is doing it wrong? Your so off on that for any major metro areas! JUST for operational needs in the IFEMS umbrella locally, we need all 20 FG TG's, the patched "non working" 2 ops TG's, car to car, and the dispatch TG's. Plus TG's for all the Hospital ED/ER's. Add in the airport, and 2 smaller municipalities that are in County. Seriously, 3 will not get r done.

 

[radionx]

Hi milf

Just asking: What's the largest number of end users you would allow on a specific Interop TG?
On a citywide TAC e.g.?

Then there is the question: Who is allowed to talk in what TGs having whatever rank to decide something...

Giving a command on a TG is nice, but does this guy talking there actually have the authorization?

Having to program 3000 TG's is doing it wrong?

I just wonder: How do you teach users who are not interested in radios to use this amount of TGs on a single radio properly under stress.

 

[Echo4Thirty]

I just wonder: How do you teach users who are not interested in radios to use this amount of TGs on a single radio properly under stress.

When the ICS 205 Comm Plan is created, each individual I/O TG/Channel is assigned a purpose. Personnel assigned to that purpose are told to put their radios on that channel and typically do not leave it.

Here we can easily have 5 or more channels just for something as simple as a fun run. Add a hurricane to the mix and 20 or more simultaneously in use.

 

[EastCoastSunrise]

Wow, I took a look at the Harris XL Series.
Anyone ever audited the baseband processors in those devices? (LTE, WLAN, Bluetooth)

I work with Fire & Civil Defense and we have to instruct people there.
I live by "3 channels and a volume knob, good loudspeaker with 3W output (sound has to be verified by users)" there. "No display" absolutely preferred. If you have to program 3000 TGs in a single radio you are doing IT wrong (means: organisation is bad)

Encrypted control channel: Rather strong authentication of joined devices with certificates.
Otherwise you are kind of creating a new encryption domain (Like a GTK in WLAN)
As for encryption: If I had to implement it - OTAR only. It's not "manageable" and/or secure otherwise.

Encryption won't save from a government whose EROI is getting negative, if you know what I mean. The foe might already be inside.

I look at it from a tactical side. Encryption won't save from what's already on the horizon.

I echo what others have said about how 3 ch is not enough. My local FD runs our ALS medic is mutual aid to a few of the surrounding towns who only have BLS trucks, so right there thats more than three channels. And with the way mutual aid is set up in my part of MA where units go to the city they are coverings primary channel or fireground and not a countywide tac channel. And just about every department dispatching them selves it means a lot of channels. I obviously dont know for sure but based on how many channels I have in my scanner to catch my town running mutual aid its close to between 25 - 50 channels if I had to guess. So no 3 channels wont work.

 

[OpSec]

My friend (who's also a sys admin) went to an APCO meeting way back and told me APCO wants most if not all public agencies to go encrypted by 2025. I don't know if this is true but is getting a $500+ scanner still worth it for the future (at least for monitoring local public safety agencies)?

Unsubstantiated drivel. What APCO meeting? Local Chapter, AFC, an RPC ??

 

[OpSec]

I bet they would like it to go all encrypted. That's a ton of cash to them. I seriously doubt most that aren't encrypted already will suddenly change their minds and dish out the high cost of encryption. Unless the government starts grants for encryption like they do other communications upgrades.

A ton of cash for who? APCO? APCO would get $0 of benefit from anyone, anywhere using encryption.

 

[INDY72]

Hi milf

Just asking: What's the largest number of end users you would allow on a specific Interop TG?
On a citywide TAC e.g.?

Then there is the question: Who is allowed to talk in what TGs having whatever rank to decide something...

Giving a command on a TG is nice, but does this guy talking there actually have the authorization?



I just wonder: How do you teach users who are not interested in radios to use this amount of TGs on a single radio properly under stress.

There is an command structure in place and constant training, which is supposed to be and really should be used nationwide on proper format for incidents. Everyone knows who is doing what at all times. Everything comes down to training. It is the lifeblood of everything from Fire/EMS to Law Enforcement. To a lesser extent it also applies to public works etc. IC assigns use of multiple TG's if needed per incident. Example: There is a big event called the Indianapolis 500 every year. There are a set of 20 Systemwide Tactical TG's that can be used for larger events such as this. 4 are full time encrypted for LEA use, though if needed, FD/EMS could go to one or more of them. For the 500 there are 2 or 3 that are for admin use, IMPD, IFD, IEMS commands for the event. Then each section gets its own TG for ops. Traffic control, EMS operations, Fire Operations, Special Operations etc... Each day on the main dispatch TG's for IFEMS, IMPD, MCSO they announce which TG's will be the main ones, and which are Ops for that day. Everyone on the event gets assigned to the TG they need. Its really not that hard.
In face they had an MCI drill today for an Aircraft Crash using the Tacticals. One for Command/Pre-Staging, One for Staging, one for Fire response/ops, one for EMS triage etc... They train on this regularly. Active Shooter, Disaster, Multiops Task Force etc. They added the Encrypted ones after the riots the other summer. They have not used them yet in an actual event, thank god, but they are there and everyone knows how to do so. We have 4 TRS that are part of the "IDPS Family" of systems, and the Statewide SAFE-T TRS for most of the surrounding areas, and the State Agencies. All the IDPS radios have all the 5 Systems in them, and the surrounding areas TG's on the SAFE-T. They also have the IDPS systems in their radios, and can fully interop with us on our, or the State system/vice versa. Its all about training. For a massive event like the explosion and multiple homes destroyed a couple years ago you will have at least 3 TG's going. Incident Command, Fire Ops, EMS ops, Triage and transport, plus the IMPD/MCSO response etc We also had Indygo, the transit buses being used to transport folks out of the area... And then you still have other incidents happening, car wrecks, Fires, Medical Calls that do not just stop, so you have to have them on other TG's. In addition IFEMS has 20 training/reserve TG's also. Then there is Fire Investigations/Arson. Its all about proper training and having some damn good comms folks that know wtf they are doing when it coms down to setting up the radio systems.

I can show you a cutsheet of how a typical FD/EMS radio is set up if you want. (Its an older one before we all went APX and added the newest TG"s but it can still show you how simple it is to just flip to where you need to go. Even more fun. all our radios have voice CH announce so you can hear what TG/CH you flip to.

 

[kb9mwr]

The future is clowdy. I can see VOIP over LTE being a thing in urban areas. Mostly as a cost saver via parterships etc.

Think software defined scanner. Like a HackRF. We all know DMR basic privacy is a joke, but likely didn't think that way initally. Unless keys are frequently changing (and they aren't due to interoperability) then APCO encryption is also full of holes.

If there is a will there is a way.

 

[mmckenna]

There is no such thing as "APCO encryption".

Encryption and interoperability can co-exist. The places it fails isn't due to a fault with encryption, it's due to inflated egos in high offices.

 

[RobKB1FJR]

I have noticed on Viper Davidson County Sherriff's and Lexington Police are ENC. NC Highway Patrol (who I hope stays in the clear) has the "common Viper ENC code" in their radios that Viper uses so they can clearly hear Davidson County Sherriff's and Lexington Police as I hear the Highway Patrol talking about Lexington Police being involved in a chase or looking for someone.

 

[fredva]

Think software defined scanner. Like a HackRF. We all know DMR basic privacy is a joke, but likely didn't think that way initally. Unless keys are frequently changing (and they aren't due to interoperability) then APCO encryption is also full of holes.

If there is a will there is a way.

How many encrypted systems have you been able to listen to, without using an authorized radio?

 

[radionx]

Encryption and interoperability can co-exist. The places it fails isn't due to a fault with encryption, it's due to inflated egos in high offices.

...sought to use public airwaves to keep the public safe. But their efforts were thwarted by an amateur radio operator who was unlawfully transmitting on frequencies dedicated to public safety.

Slightly OT: What a society we have become...

Encryption won't save us from what's already showing up on the horizon.

I see the balkans. It begins to feel like autumn 1990 in the balkans. But this time widespread.

A hurricane, you can prepare for it, albeit only a few hours before. Riots & unrest flaming up everywhere because there is no food...will feel different. Also from a tactical side. The dynamics will be different.

The World's Greatest Unreported Hyperinflation | Cato Institute

 

[INDaviation]

I can show you a cutsheet of how a typical FD/EMS radio is set up if you want. (Its an older one before we all went APX and added the newest TG"s but it can still show you how simple it is to just flip to where you need to go.

This might be worth adding to the Marion County wiki page just for reference. I know the Hennepin County, MN wiki has a ton of data like this.

 

[kb9mwr]

How many encrypted systems have you been able to listen to, without using an authorized radio?

That depends on if you know someone or happen to stumble into a radio with a key and clone it I suppose. The easy route. Else brute force and that can be done too; Security Researchers Crack APCO P25 Encryption

 

[mmckenna]

That depends on if you know someone or happen to stumble into a radio with a key and clone it I suppose. The easy route. Else brute force and that can be done too; Security Researchers Crack APCO P25 Encryption

Again, there's no such thing as "APCO Encryption". The person that wrote that title didn't know what they were saying.
What the article does say:

The paper details flaws in the DES-OFB and ADP encryption that enable the encryption key to be recovered by traditional brute force key searching​

ADP was always a half-azzed encryption protocol. So much so that Motorola used to give it away for free. The Feds require AES-256.
DES is not AES-256.
This is an old outdated article talking about encryption protocols that no agency in their right mind would use.

And encryption keys are not carried over when cloning a radio.

 

[radionx]

And encryption keys are not carried over when cloning a radio.

Best practise. If you are looking for vectors to get the keys you have to look out for:

• Is the baseband processor secure
• Can the key be read out "in flight" (RAM, EEPROM, CPU...evavesdropping on a bus...whatever)

RE: Physical security of a device.

Maybe you can get it like the KRBTGT key on Windows servers by creating a dump. You're set then
OTAR is a must.

Are those devices implementing AES256 under review by independent cryptopgraphers? Is there a security chip like a TPM in those devices? An enclave?

My idea would be implementing my own CA with certificates for those devices joined to my network. Strong authentication which enables reliable encryption.

Then again...if you want to commit serious crimes business you better buy a politican than monitor police radio.
Monitoring police radio is for freaks, "serious business" people have things like the WEF.
Maybe that's why we as people have to carry covid certificates and the government has become a certification authority (CA).

Oops!

 

[TDR-94]

Best practise. If you are looking for vectors to get the keys you have to look out for:

• Is the baseband processor secure
• Can the key be read out "in flight" (RAM, EEPROM, CPU...evavesdropping on a bus...whatever)

RE: Physical security of a device.

Maybe you can get it like the KRBTGT key on Windows servers by creating a dump. You're set then
OTAR is a must.

Are those devices implementing AES256 under review by independent cryptopgraphers? Is there a security chip like a TPM in those devices? An enclave?

My idea would be implementing my own CA with certificates for those devices joined to my network. Strong authentication which enables reliable encryption.

Then again...if you want to commit serious crimes business you better buy a politican than monitor police radio.
Monitoring police radio is for freaks, "serious business" people have things like the WEF.
Maybe that's why we as people have to carry covid certificates and the government has become a certification authority (CA).

Oops!

FIPS Security Level 4 certification would help thwart off most, if not all of those attempts on a device. Not likely that any "typical" Public Safety users' radios will ever be certified to that level though.

There are also certification programs specifically for U.S. Government and Military devices, like computers, radios, etc.. that are designed around preventing similar attempts at compromising those devices, including side-channel attacks.