They are using 168.7375 as air to ground command.
As of this morning’s briefing:
Acres Burned: 15,000
Structures Threatened: 400
Containment: 10%
Engines: 91
Crews: 31
Helicopters: 16 (7-T1/7-T2/2-T3)
Fixed Wing: 7 (including 2 lead plane, 4 air-tankers and 1 DC-10)
Water Tenders: 6
Dozers: 5
Total personnel assigned to the Fire: 1343
Unfortunately, the air resources are having to contend with the Presidential TFR in place for Obama’s golfing weekend in Palm Springs.
A trend has started, I believe mainly in California, to have a command air to ground and a tactical air to ground. Command air to ground is for the IC, all of the honchos in aviation, the operations chief, branch directors and division supervisors to talk about strategy and longer term use of air resources. Tactical air to ground is used by division sups and below (strike team leaders, hotshot crew superintendents, Type II crew bosses and other individual resources such as engines and dozers) to provide details about where and how retardant and water is dropped on fires as well as speak about helispot location and construction.
The other trend is to split up the operations chief position into "ops" and "planning ops." Planning ops is involved in what resources are needed where, what the assignments should be on each division, etc. This allows the operations chief to concentrate on the current situation instead of focusing on what the planning section needs to write up the next incident action plan (AKA shift plan). I've not worked a fire where a planning ops is used so I really can't explain it in much more detail than that, at least from experience. I worked in plans on many fires, most often as a resource unit leader and it was often difficult to get the ops chief to take enough time to tell us what he needed for the next shift and what the resources needed to do. Errors and inefficiencies would creep into the plan, where they didn't always get the right crews to the areas they were needed. Sometimes ops wanted specific crews to work specific locations so they might say something like we need the Wyoming Hotshots on the north end of Division C, the San Carlos Shots in the center of the division and the Crane Valley Shots on the south end to conduct such things as burnouts, backfires if needed, hot fireline construction and a host of other tasks reserved for Type I crews. If these three crews had worked together on that division and on a specific ridge the ops chief wants those three back in the same spot. If ops doesn't keep track and give that to planning, the form used to develop the plan may only show that 3 Type I crews are needed on Division C, 6 on Division F and 1 on Division X. Some details such as keeping the the three specific crews on Division C even if that means having fewer Type I crews on Division F. In the heat of the battle such details may not get communicated effectively, leading to problems on subsequent shifts. I've been yelled at for not putting the right crews in the right places because the information I was given was vague or passed along with so many other details in such a short period I could not write it down effectively. Ops chiefs are always being interrupted by radio traffic and trying to talk with them is tough and the two planning meetings a day might not provide the opportunity to get these specifics passed along. Having a liaison between ops and plans helps reduce such problems.
It is a real challenge to manage a highly dynamic situation with several hundred or several thousand people who have not worked together in the same combinations on land many have never seen before. The core of the incident management teams remains fairly constant, but the entire staffing of the fire will always be a bit different even if many of the same crews, apparatus, supply units etc. have worked together on other fires before. Getting everyone organized to do exactly what is needed is a challenge, especially when the team first arrives along with huge numbers of other resources during the period or periods fires are moving quickly and blowing up. Recon information is often hard to come by as it is tough to get people to the right locations at the right times to observe the fire and list such things as fences, roads, potential safety zones, water sources, changes in vegetation types, on and on and on. Keeping field observers safe, who often work alone, is challenging as well. Local folks often have some very good information, but they are often taking care of other matters that pile up when they have a major incident on land they manage on the long term.
The reward is making order out of chaos, keeping in mind that the three best things about fires are: going there, the trip home and getting paid.