kayn1n32008
ØÆSØ Say it, say 'ENCRYPTION'
Most, if not all, current P25 radios should have, or have the option to add, LLA.The Kenwood NX-5000 Radios I see have the same option.
Most, if not all, current P25 radios should have, or have the option to add, LLA.The Kenwood NX-5000 Radios I see have the same option.
Link layer has been part of the P25 standard for a long time. The disconnect occurred when manufacturers were allowed to make it optional on the systems and subscriber units, leaving us in the pickle we‘re in now.LLA, or any sort of challange/response system, should have been a basic security feature of the P25 protocol.
As it is, there is ZERO security or access control to a P25 network. Let's be honest, the 'system key' as a security device to prevent unauthorized programming of subscribers was absolutely broken LOOOONG before 9600baud trunking was even a thing.
Got news for you, but the same software exists for DMR and NXDN. P25 isn’t the only victim, and those others were not developed by APCO. It’s an industry-wide failing.Just the need for specific software to watch for cloned/hacked/unauthorized radios goes to show just how badly APCO failed in the development of Project 25.
Use of the ESN vs programmable RID would have been one method to reduce cloning. Would have been nice if they had defined the structure of the core so you could use equipment from any manufacture instead of being married for life to one. This will all be moot once FirstNet is fully built out and PS moves to an LTE based network.LLA, or any sort of challange/response system, should have been a basic security feature of the P25 protocol.
As it is, there is ZERO security or access control to a P25 network. Let's be honest, the 'system key' as a security device to prevent unauthorized programming of subscribers was absolutely broken LOOOONG before 9600baud trunking was even a thing.
Just the need for specific software to watch for cloned/hacked/unauthorized radios goes to show just how badly APCO failed in the development of Project 25.
For Both tier 3, and NXDN type-c there are further provisions to prevent cloned and unauthorized radios from accessing the system. This isn't an additional feature, it's how it's designed to operate. There is nothing, if LLA isn't used and enforced, with P25.Got news for you, but the same software exists for DMR and NXDN. P25 isn’t the only victim, and those others were not developed by APCO. It’s an industry-wide failing.
Trequiri validation of the ESN+RID would stop any unauthorized radios. Especially if it was required the ESN+RID be sent OTA encrypted. Even better would he having a trunked transmission flag that subscribers would recognize and ignore if it is on a conventional channel(like NXDN)Use of the ESN vs programmable RID would have been one method to reduce cloning.
First Net is not going to replace LMR for first responders any time soon. Cell companies are not in the habit of building coverage were there are not people.This will all be moot once FirstNet is fully built out and PS moves to an LTE based network.
Not soon, but 10-15 years we'll see the transition to LTE begin. The cost of infrastructure and ongoing maintenance will drive this move similar to how technology costs are driving dispatch consolidation. This assumes the First Net Authority has built out enough sites to support it.Trequiri validation of the ESN+RID would stop any unauthorized radios. Especially if it was required the ESN+RID be sent OTA encrypted. Even better would he having a trunked transmission flag that subscribers would recognize and ignore if it is on a conventional channel(like NXDN)
First Net is not going to replace LMR for first responders any time soon. Cell companies are not in the habit of building coverage were there are not people.
The second radio overrides the first in the authentication server. Hopefully the first and all radios are programmed to honk if affiliation fails so they are aware the radio will not work.So, when a radio is 'authenticated', it is as was said, but it does get tied to a serial number, since if you try another radio with the same ID, it won't allow it. I haven't actually seen a case yet, but I think if you try to authenticate a second radio with the the same ID as one that has already been authenticated, it throws up a flag.
FirstNet isn't building sites, AT&T is.Not soon, but 10-15 years we'll see the transition to LTE begin. The cost of infrastructure and ongoing maintenance will drive this move similar to how technology costs are driving dispatch consolidation. This assumes the First Net Authority has built out enough sites to support it.
No, the disconnect was APCO not including it in the ORIGIONAL publication of Project 25, and making it a functional requirement in the protocol. It was an after thought.Link layer has been part of the P25 standard for a long time. The disconnect occurred when manufacturers were allowed to make it optional
On a system that requires LLA, you have to have a LLA key loaded into the legit radio. When the radio goes to register, the controller will challange the radio in response to its registration attempt. If it is a legit subscriber, it will respond to the challange, and if it is the correct response, the controller will allow the registration, and let the radio affiliate to the selected talkgroup(assuming the talkgroup is valid on the site).So, when a radio is 'authenticated', it is as was said, but it does get tied to a serial number, since if you try another radio with the same ID, it won't allow it. I haven't actually seen a case yet, but I think if you try to authenticate a second radio withe the same ID as one that has already been authenticated, it throws up a flag.
But even on systems that do not use this, if it's a multi-site (not simulcast) system, and two radios with the same ID try to access from different sites, it will eventually deny both radios. Two radios with the same ID can't be logged into two different sites at the same time. That is something I've seen with MARCS in years past.
Under contract with FirstNet Authority.FirstNet isn't building sites, AT&T is.
This is not "two factor authentication", it's "single factor authentication". What do you think the second factor is?Link layer authentication is two factor authentication. If the feature wasn't purchased originally, the user can add it to radios which support this feature. An encrypted key is programmed into the radio and sent to the system as part of the affiliation process. The user does not need to supply MARCS with the ESN of their radios.
RID + keyThis is not "two factor authentication", it's "single factor authentication". What do you think the second factor is?
RID is not authentication. RID is like a username. I would not consider a username without a password, an authentication factor.RID + key
Again, FirstNet isn't building anything.Under contract with FirstNet Authority.
So what happens when FirstNet/AT&T shots the bed and the network fails?Not soon, but 10-15 years we'll see the transition to LTE begin. The cost of infrastructure and ongoing maintenance will drive this move similar to how technology costs are driving dispatch consolidation. This assumes the First Net Authority has built out enough sites to support it.