Russian Military using Motorola Digital👀

[RFI-EMI-GUY]

This is the correct answer. I doubt the algorithm has been defeated.

There has been a lot of speculation about "known plaintext" attacks on AES (and DES) . The weak point being certain data created by the Vocoder such as silence and control bits. I would not dismiss the capabilities of a determined adversary.

 

[ElroyJetson]

If his keyfill device is a cheap Chinese Android phone and USB cable....I think I found the leak!

 

[jimmy9999]

they started with Motorola and Hytera mostly simplex though the radio's are expensive and no radioman in the field any longer believes that AES-256 is actually secure so an alternative solution was sought.

Why do you say "no radioman in the field any longer believes that AES-256 is actually secure ?"
256-bit key, which takes more years to find the key to the number of stars in the universe, etc.

 

[Bowlieweekender]

That's what Fort Meade wants you to believe, so you go right ahead believing that. Same goes for Tetra TEA1/2/3 for those outside the US.

 

[jimmy9999]

That's what Fort Meade wants you to believe, so you go right ahead believing that. Same goes for Tetra TEA1/2/3 for those outside the US.

So you think that there are backdoors in all the radios sold, both in the US and for export?

 

[ElroyJetson]

The complete AES-256 algorithm and "source code" for AES has been in the public domain for years. Nobody has yet found a back door to it.
That's probably an indicator that there isn't one.
Be sure that a lot of REALLY smart researchers have gone hunting for that particular snipe.

So far, no snipe has been found.

 

[jimmy9999]

The complete AES-256 algorithm and "source code" for AES has been in the public domain for years. Nobody has yet found a back door to it.
That's probably an indicator that there isn't one.
Be sure that a lot of REALLY smart researchers have gone hunting for that particular snipe.

So far, no snipe has been found.

I'm not talking about backdoor in the algorithm itself, but in the implementation in radios, like for example the backdoor I found in Motorola's LFSR RC4.

I found a bug in Motorola DMRA ARC4

I found a bug in Motorola DMRA ARC4 Encryption. The bug is present in the standard, so it is found in all manufacturers who use the DMRA ARC4 standard. The DMRA standard uses an LFSR to generate 32 hit IVs. An IV (Initialization Vector) should only be repeated after 4 billion times (2 to the...

forums.radioreference.com

No independent researchers have verified the AES implementations in the radios themselves. The fact that the radios are interoperable does not guarantee the absence of a backdoor. One bit of the key can be delivered randomly in each AMBE frame, as explained here:

Bckdoor

cryptomuseum.com

 

[jimmy9999]

It should be remembered that Motorola has already put backdoors in Securenet DVP radios.

DVP

www.cryptomuseum.com

They managed to simulate the algorithm in software and proved that it could be broken in realtime with simple methods.

https://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/motorola/saber/files/vulcan_201409.pdf

 

[kayn1n32008]

There has been a lot of speculation about "known plaintext" attacks on AES (and DES) . The weak point being certain data created by the Vocoder such as silence and control bits. I would not dismiss the capabilities of a determined adversary.

DES is a broken algorithm, that was broken uears ago.

It should be remembered that Motorola has already put backdoors in Securenet DVP radios.

DVP

www.cryptomuseum.com

They managed to simulate the algorithm in software and proved that it could be broken in realtime with simple methods.

https://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/motorola/saber/files/vulcan_201409.pdf

And DVP was an unvetted, proprietary cipher, that was weak even in the 70's. They simulated the algorithm in 2014.

Don't just quote what you think supports your position, quote it all.

Also DVP-XL was an 'export cipher'

 

[kayn1n32008]

It should be remembered that Motorola has already put backdoors in Securenet DVP radios.

AES is an open sourced algorithm. It has been vetted by the crypto community. DVP was a proprietary algorithm that was never subject to any sort of vetting.

 

[KevinC]

AES is an open sourced algorithm. It has been vetted by the crypto community. DVP was a proprietary algorithm that was never subject to any sort of vetting.

And I'm pretty sure DVP was the ADP of the 70's. It's main purpose being an anti-scanner option.

 

[kayn1n32008]

And I'm pretty sure DVP was the ADP of the 70's. It's main purpose being an anti-scanner option.

I also believe DVP-XL was a weakend version for export

 

[KevinC]

I also believe DVP-XL was a weakend version for export

I think that was DVI-XL. DVP-XL "fixed" the range issues with DVP (same for DES vs DES-XL).

 

[vjkurvy]

I actually watched a video and agree with EVERYONES comments. At the start of the war, I believe they were using scattered weapons and radios. I donated a bunch of HT1000s and all baofengs that were stockpiled all over place. At the beginning (when things started to get a little more organized) I think they (Ukrainians) were swapping entire cache’s of ammo and radios. The radios that were running TDMA via “trailer sites” were taken back and OTA rekeyed for encryption/ or manually pushed. The Tetra radios as any Brit will tell you was a pretty stable system (up into 10 years ago was considered uncrackable). Before anyone jumps this comment, I do not know much about Tetra. I do not care what anyone “thinks” they know about Motorola TDMA/FDA but good luck trying to listen to an actual “encrypted” system.. ask any user with the best SDR or a actual Moto capable radio.. it can’t be done. You may see an Astro ID pop up but you can’t hear anything…

 

[ElroyJetson]

The KSA (Known Silence Attack) can be rendered moot by implementing rolling keys, but ask me if or how rolling keys are implemented in a P25 environment and I'll just tell you that I don't know anything about that. Because it's the truth. I don't know.

I do know that AES is a deterministic algorithm. For a specific input, and a specific key, the output will always be the same. If the input word was, for example, "7311" in hex, with a specific key, call it key ABC123 and that caused the output to be "1234" in hex, then every time the input word is 7311 the output is 1234. As long as key ABC123 is being used.

And, there are only a limited number of sound "symbols" in the IMBE/AMBE codecs. It provides a limited range of word values, rather than all possible world values. This limits the possible number of input symbols. This implies a reduced workload required to mathematically crack the encryption, except that you still have to deal with the rolling code if implemented.

However, the weakness is not in AES itself, but in the handling of the keys. Key security is a limiting factor in system security.

 

[jimmy9999]

AES is an open sourced algorithm. It has been vetted by the crypto community. DVP was a proprietary algorithm that was never subject to any sort of vetting.

I have the impression that you do not understand what I am saying. Do you know the difference between an algorithm and the implementation of the algorithm? The algorithm may be reliable, but the implementation may not.

The LFSR used with the algorithm may be weak, the implementation may deliberately drop bits of the key into the encrypted stream.

I get the impression that you believe that if an algorithm is reliable then there can be no backdoor, this is not the case at all.

If I took the example of the DVP it is to show that Motorola has used weak algorithms even for the US domestic market.
In addition, today, Motorola sells the same AES products in the domestic market and in the foreign market.

P25 products are bound to be reliable (no backdoors) because they are intended for public safety.
The same does not apply to DMR products intended for the domestic market.

I'm demonstrating that Motorola deliberately introduced an extra backdoor into RC4 to break it even more easily when it was already weak, but you're repeating the fact that RC4 is weak and AES is strong, whereas the backdoor was not introduced in RC4 but in the implementation of RC4 (not in the algorithm itself).

 

[kayn1n32008]

I have the impression that you do not understand what I am saying. Do you know the difference between an algorithm and the implementation of the algorithm? The algorithm may be reliable, but the implementation may not.

The LFSR used with the algorithm may be weak, the implementation may deliberately drop bits of the key into the encrypted stream.

Oh I do understand.

You haven't shown there is a 'back door'in the DMRA implementation of AES, and to my(albeit limited knoweledge) there has been no such weakness found in either the implementation of AES, or weakness in the cipher.

 

[KevinC]

Oh I do understand.

You haven't shown there is a 'back door'in the DMRA implementation of AES, and to my(albeit limited knoweledge) there has been no such weakness found in either the implementation of AES, or weakness in the cipher.

I heard if you use "Joshua" as your key variable it will decode all other keys. I know Joshua isn't hexadecimal, but it is the only exception to the hex requirement.

 

[jimmy9999]

I heard if you use "Joshua" as your key variable it will decode all other keys. I know Joshua isn't hexadecimal, but it is the only exception to the hex requirement.

Don't play with this code, you risk starting a Global Thermonculear War !

 

[KevinC]

I think after almost 2 years we can close this.