Future encryption

[ProScan]

That's absolutely an issue. Some get in a job, get comfortable, and refuse to change.
In radio systems, that's kind of difficult to do, or those that do it don't last long. Technology changes, and you have to keep up. FCC mandated narrow banding required a lot of radio systems to be updated/changed/reprogrammed, so that sort of prevented a bit of stagnation. Some rely on contractors or vendors for everything, so it does happen.

In a somewhat related story, I know of several companies that boast about how long employees stay. While that can certainly be a good thing, it can also be a hindrance, if folks settle into the mantra "we have always done it this way." It somewhat relates to radios, in that folks who have done this for a long time tend to believe they have a firm understanding of the concepts, because that's how it worked a long time ago or they assume based on incorrect fundamental knowledge.

I think employee longevity is more of a good thing than a hindrance. I retired from a government agency with 31 radio sites and hundreds of non-radio sites, 5 years ago, I was on the maintenance side. I can say that the morale is higher, lots of comradery, people are motivated, eager to learn new technologies, create new test procedures, miraculously maintain documentation, etc. Some people are like an encyclopedia, ask them a question about a site and they will tell you all about the power plants, type of systems, traffic on the systems, etc so the continuity of info is greater. During an emergency such as a site or microwave hop down, we can count on them any hour of the day to reroute T1 circuits. When the PD or FD calls for a command post, we'll be right on top of it building T1 circuits to the CP, providing Intranet, video, & dial tone.

With a large organization that I was in with lots of different types of technician positions such as in radio, data, telephone, system monitor, FD & PD dispatch centers, mobile installs, cable crew, intrusion alarms, etc. Everyone's skill set is matched with the position.

 

[mmckenna]

Some people are like an encyclopedia, ask them a question about a site and they will tell you all about the power plants, type of systems, traffic on the systems, etc so the continuity of info is greater. During an emergency such as a site or microwave hop down, we can count on them any hour of the day to reroute T1 circuits. When the PD or FD calls for a command post, we'll be right on top of it building T1 circuits to the CP, providing Intranet, video, & dial tone.

AKA: "Institutional Knowledge".

I've been here 25 years. One of my guys has been here 24 years. Our cable plant engineer has been here 23 years. Our construction manager has been here 24 years.
Nearly 100 years of knowledge in 4 people.

Knowledge like that is irreplaceable. It takes a year or more before our field techs are really useful on their own in the field.

However, we pretty much have a pact to all retire at the same time. No one wants to be stuck as the last one...

 

[ToddWilkinson]

2nd amendment? I think you’re confused. I don’t see where any amendments apply here.

Yeah sorry lol

 

[kb0uxv]

The recent FBI determination that all CJIS federally held data (private data on a person such as gang affiliations, sex offender status, missing person status, etc) must be aired using at least 128 bit AES encryption is the latest thing pushing law enforcement to encryption. The BCA disseminated this determination to MN agencies in 2022 which prompted more focus on encrypted mains. I understand and appreciate the hobbyists resistance to this change, on a site like this most come together with a common interest in this hobby and the push to encryption is an obvious threat to that. And society's push towards more transparency in public safety is also a valid point. Interoperability between PD/EMS/FD can suffer greatly if encryption is not carefully planned and implemented.

I hope Minnesota's scanning community can give some thought to the other perspective from the field users and admins posted above. Radioing on LTAC1 of your position for stop sticks and to have the suspect vehicle turn off to avoid your position and continue to lead a dangerous (for suspect, LE, and the public) pursuit is frustrating. Calling out to check a warrant and hearing yourself come over the phone of the person answering the door (the web streams have a bit of delay compared to live traffic) is alarming. But above all else the CJIS determination will begin to have more sway on this topic (assuming the FBI maintains their position) as agencies that stay clear will get dinged on a CJIS audit, unless other methods are carefully constructed to avoid airing anything like that on clear mains (alternate encrypted TGs, cell phone, MDT, etc). Those of you who scan alot know this is not an easy thing especially in the heat of the moment when routine is out the window. I know some agencies have hosted their own public feeds with their decrypted radio traffic, with a substantial (30 min or more) delay but the recent CJIS data decision would also threaten that practice.

 

[mmckenna]

The recent FBI determination that all CJIS federally held data (private data on a person such as gang affiliations, sex offender status, missing person status, etc) must be aired using at least 128 bit AES encryption is the latest thing pushing law enforcement to encryption.

It's actually 256 bit AES.
And while not a new requirement, I'm glad to hear they are reminding people of it.

As I've said before, when people blamed California for this, it's not California, it goes all the way back to the feds. If someone thinks it's not coming to their state, they are mistaken.

 

[kb0uxv]

It's actually 256 bit AES.
And while not a new requirement, I'm glad to hear they are reminding people of it.

As I've said before, when people blamed California for this, it's not California, it goes all the way back to the feds. If someone thinks it's not coming to their state, they are mistaken.

I thought the AES128 was odd as well since AES-GCM is rarely used in the radio world. The standard states "CJI data must be encrypted in transit using NIST certified FIPS 140-2 encryption with a 128-bit symmetric key and at rest using FIPS 197 certified encryption with 256-bit encryption."