Key Bridge Collapse
- Thread starter tvengr
- Start date
Unified Command, Joint Information Center established for Key Bridge Response 2024
A Unified Command and Joint Information Center have been established in Baltimore Wednesday to coordinate response and disseminate information for the Francis Scott Key Bridge collapse on Tuesday
www.news.uscg.mil
I have been surprised that no recording of the Channel 16 comms have been released. Primarily of the Mayday and immediate follow on.
As someone who doesn't live near bodies of water, I would be curious how Marine Channel 16 is used. Does the coast guard utilize a bunch of linked remote base stations tied to Ch. 16? I'd be curious how that works.
The Coast Guard uses a system called Rescue 21 that supports international marine channels and their own UHF and VHF infrastructure. In Sector MD-NCR (basically Maryland and a segment of Virginia waters down to Accomack,) they utilize a number of sites (<10) near navigable waterways to provide coverage and direction-finding.
This video gives you an idea what channel 16 is used for.
Sector Maryland NCR Rescue 21 site information linked below.
This is a copy/paste from another forum I'm on. This cat knows his stuff. This a 2 post copy/paste from him. The first on his opinions on what happened, the second after he was asked abouthis background. This guy seems to know his stuff, and being a nuke guy goes into detail on a wall of text. Enjoy, I did.
"I am willing to bet fuel filters/RACOR for the generators. Either someone swapped out filters while she was berthed and did not clear any trapped air after the swap, or dirty fuel. I would also check fuel from the settlers and the day tanks.
She has 5 generators onboard with +20K kVA. I am going to guess they had generators (2 min) paralleling with one on STNDBY. With the fuel issue, the paralleling generators started dropping RPM, thus UV and Freq issues, and breakers tripped. That is when you see the first power outage. The CE or EoW then switched over to the STNDBY generator, and that is when the lights came back on assuming that they were not using a Power Management System. Lights go out again when the STNDBY generator goes off line due to same fuel issue. The third time that the lights come back on is probably because the Egen was online, and has an independent fuel source. The Egen requires anywhere from 30 to 45 seconds without voltage on the main bus to kick on. Once all of the ER generators were failing, CE or Master/Capt probably directed to remain on Egen so atleast they would have minimum vital systems (half of the steering HPU, cooling pumps, etc.).
The dark plume of exhaust is when the Master when from full ahead for maximum thrust across the rudder to crash stop/full astern. Curious as to how the main shaft responded.
They do not maneuver in harbor under any automation, so no AP or Autotrack, it is manually controlled at the helm or wing stations.
There are two pilots: a Docking Pilot to take her away from the berth and a River/Bay pilot to sail and navigate from the channel down to the Bay opening. Tugs are only there to assist when moving away from the berth, and typically they are not "made up"/secured with lines. This vessel has thrusters, so she can handle normal environmental dockings by herself. After the vessel moves from the berth, the assist tugs depart because they are not escort tugs, and they have other vessels to assist or go back to the berth for downtime.
You can see from the AIS tracking that one of the assist tugs turned around and tried to return to the vessel to assist but was too late with too much distance to cover."
A reply from him based on questions.
"My background is mechanical and marine engineering with a concentration on nuclear, the first eight years were with A4Ws and S6Gs, so Bubbleheads and Nukes from the start. I am not a licensed mariner, but I have either managed the design, managed the construction, or managed the overhaul/repair of various vessel types since 1988. One phase of my career was Testing & Commissioning of both Naval and Commercial vessels. Part of that is developing/performing Design Verification Test Procedure (DVTP), Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA), and Periodical Safety Test Procedure (PSTP). These tests are Regulatory requirements (NAVSEA, ABS, USCG) to prevent what happened in Baltimore. You go through a series of single point failures to show how the design prevents the vessel from being in a position of helplessness, which is what happened here.
Another phase was final delivery requirements prior to customer acceptance. I have spent many hours on the bridge with Masters/Captains/Mates and many hours in the ER/ECR with Chief Engineers, 1st Engs, etc. I was also a dockmaster for a few years (I would bring vessels into a graving drydock, pump out the water until she landed on the blocks safely and in correct position, then pump the balance of the water), so I have worked with docking and river/bay pilots.
If they had a lower tier of QMED swapping the filters, he may have been lucky previously and not had any issues with either vacuum or trapped air when working the Racor assemblies. I agree that having all of the filters impact at the same time is a long shot, but I have experienced worse issues that I thought could never happen. The other variable that I cannot recall for this class is if she had a shaft generator so that the arrangement would have been 4 ea SSDGs and a single shaft generator, backed up by the Egen that should be located in the aft machinery casing, where the stacks (exhaust piping) can be seen in between the container stacks. If not the filters, I would lean towards dirty fuel. I am also curious if the Engineers keep the sets of generators segregated (2 feeding from port, 2 feeding from stbd for fuel) similar to Dynamic Positioning rated vessels for redundancy (that does not appear to have worked based upon the outages).
One other fact, this vessel is rated for "Periodically Unattended Machinery Space". That means that the engine room can run on automation for a Regulatory approved period of time WITHOUT any engineers legally being required in the engine room on watch. So, if the watch engineers were out of the ER, and things started failing, the Power Management System or Machinery Automation Monitoring System started cycling through generators failure after failure. Alarms were probably going off, and the Chief Engineer who was probably asleep had his alarm panel in the Day Room or Stateroom screaming, and called down asking "WTF is going on"? The Engineer on Watch probably hauled ass down to the ER or ECR but was too late to keep the plant online, stable before the allision.
The vessel is not diesel electric in the sense that the main propulsion is from a large motor, powered by generators. This vessel has a Hyundai Heavy Industries diesel engine directly coupled to the main propulsion shaft (900mm Bore, 3,260mm Stroke, 41,480 kW @ 82.5 RPM).
I am curious if Ports will change how assist tugs work with vessels transiting under bridges in small channels/harbors going forward. Typically, they are only there to give the vessel "nudges" on command from the docking pilot to counter another force (wind, current, wash coming back from the berth), and they are not typically made up to the ship because the evolution is so quick combined with the capabilities of the vessel. I believe the docking pilot is a McAllister Tug captain from the Baltimore office. Once they are away from the berth, he turns it over to the river or bay pilot and departs the vessel onto one of the assist tugs, or with the other pilot at the buoy.
This is very long, but the conspiracy theories are nonsense, so hopefully this will help eliminate those types of posts. The important issue is that 6 people who were trying to provide for their families and worked a difficult/dangerous job are not going home. The good things out of this is that the ABs or Deckies that worked the anchor windlasses to release the chains/anchors got out of there before they were crushed by the bridge structure, and the Pilot issued a Mayday in advance for crossing traffic. I feel sorry for the vessel Captain and the Pilot. I know the Pilot, and she was very good at her job. She is NOT a DEI hire, so that BS that is being cycled also pisses me off. I have been in vessel bridges during near misses and my posterior was puckered. The feeling of helplessness is the only way I can explain it, and is very uncomfortable. They have to live with this for the rest of their lives, and it is not because they were not doing everything they could to prevent it."
"I am willing to bet fuel filters/RACOR for the generators. Either someone swapped out filters while she was berthed and did not clear any trapped air after the swap, or dirty fuel. I would also check fuel from the settlers and the day tanks.
She has 5 generators onboard with +20K kVA. I am going to guess they had generators (2 min) paralleling with one on STNDBY. With the fuel issue, the paralleling generators started dropping RPM, thus UV and Freq issues, and breakers tripped. That is when you see the first power outage. The CE or EoW then switched over to the STNDBY generator, and that is when the lights came back on assuming that they were not using a Power Management System. Lights go out again when the STNDBY generator goes off line due to same fuel issue. The third time that the lights come back on is probably because the Egen was online, and has an independent fuel source. The Egen requires anywhere from 30 to 45 seconds without voltage on the main bus to kick on. Once all of the ER generators were failing, CE or Master/Capt probably directed to remain on Egen so atleast they would have minimum vital systems (half of the steering HPU, cooling pumps, etc.).
The dark plume of exhaust is when the Master when from full ahead for maximum thrust across the rudder to crash stop/full astern. Curious as to how the main shaft responded.
They do not maneuver in harbor under any automation, so no AP or Autotrack, it is manually controlled at the helm or wing stations.
There are two pilots: a Docking Pilot to take her away from the berth and a River/Bay pilot to sail and navigate from the channel down to the Bay opening. Tugs are only there to assist when moving away from the berth, and typically they are not "made up"/secured with lines. This vessel has thrusters, so she can handle normal environmental dockings by herself. After the vessel moves from the berth, the assist tugs depart because they are not escort tugs, and they have other vessels to assist or go back to the berth for downtime.
You can see from the AIS tracking that one of the assist tugs turned around and tried to return to the vessel to assist but was too late with too much distance to cover."
A reply from him based on questions.
"My background is mechanical and marine engineering with a concentration on nuclear, the first eight years were with A4Ws and S6Gs, so Bubbleheads and Nukes from the start. I am not a licensed mariner, but I have either managed the design, managed the construction, or managed the overhaul/repair of various vessel types since 1988. One phase of my career was Testing & Commissioning of both Naval and Commercial vessels. Part of that is developing/performing Design Verification Test Procedure (DVTP), Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA), and Periodical Safety Test Procedure (PSTP). These tests are Regulatory requirements (NAVSEA, ABS, USCG) to prevent what happened in Baltimore. You go through a series of single point failures to show how the design prevents the vessel from being in a position of helplessness, which is what happened here.
Another phase was final delivery requirements prior to customer acceptance. I have spent many hours on the bridge with Masters/Captains/Mates and many hours in the ER/ECR with Chief Engineers, 1st Engs, etc. I was also a dockmaster for a few years (I would bring vessels into a graving drydock, pump out the water until she landed on the blocks safely and in correct position, then pump the balance of the water), so I have worked with docking and river/bay pilots.
If they had a lower tier of QMED swapping the filters, he may have been lucky previously and not had any issues with either vacuum or trapped air when working the Racor assemblies. I agree that having all of the filters impact at the same time is a long shot, but I have experienced worse issues that I thought could never happen. The other variable that I cannot recall for this class is if she had a shaft generator so that the arrangement would have been 4 ea SSDGs and a single shaft generator, backed up by the Egen that should be located in the aft machinery casing, where the stacks (exhaust piping) can be seen in between the container stacks. If not the filters, I would lean towards dirty fuel. I am also curious if the Engineers keep the sets of generators segregated (2 feeding from port, 2 feeding from stbd for fuel) similar to Dynamic Positioning rated vessels for redundancy (that does not appear to have worked based upon the outages).
One other fact, this vessel is rated for "Periodically Unattended Machinery Space". That means that the engine room can run on automation for a Regulatory approved period of time WITHOUT any engineers legally being required in the engine room on watch. So, if the watch engineers were out of the ER, and things started failing, the Power Management System or Machinery Automation Monitoring System started cycling through generators failure after failure. Alarms were probably going off, and the Chief Engineer who was probably asleep had his alarm panel in the Day Room or Stateroom screaming, and called down asking "WTF is going on"? The Engineer on Watch probably hauled ass down to the ER or ECR but was too late to keep the plant online, stable before the allision.
The vessel is not diesel electric in the sense that the main propulsion is from a large motor, powered by generators. This vessel has a Hyundai Heavy Industries diesel engine directly coupled to the main propulsion shaft (900mm Bore, 3,260mm Stroke, 41,480 kW @ 82.5 RPM).
I am curious if Ports will change how assist tugs work with vessels transiting under bridges in small channels/harbors going forward. Typically, they are only there to give the vessel "nudges" on command from the docking pilot to counter another force (wind, current, wash coming back from the berth), and they are not typically made up to the ship because the evolution is so quick combined with the capabilities of the vessel. I believe the docking pilot is a McAllister Tug captain from the Baltimore office. Once they are away from the berth, he turns it over to the river or bay pilot and departs the vessel onto one of the assist tugs, or with the other pilot at the buoy.
This is very long, but the conspiracy theories are nonsense, so hopefully this will help eliminate those types of posts. The important issue is that 6 people who were trying to provide for their families and worked a difficult/dangerous job are not going home. The good things out of this is that the ABs or Deckies that worked the anchor windlasses to release the chains/anchors got out of there before they were crushed by the bridge structure, and the Pilot issued a Mayday in advance for crossing traffic. I feel sorry for the vessel Captain and the Pilot. I know the Pilot, and she was very good at her job. She is NOT a DEI hire, so that BS that is being cycled also pisses me off. I have been in vessel bridges during near misses and my posterior was puckered. The feeling of helplessness is the only way I can explain it, and is very uncomfortable. They have to live with this for the rest of their lives, and it is not because they were not doing everything they could to prevent it."
mmckenna
I ♥ Ø
The shaft would be designed to take that load. In storms it is not uncommon for the screw to come out of the water and suddenly have no load on it, then back in the water with a big load.
Your post mirrors what I've read on some of the USCG facebook pages. No, FB is not an authoritative source, but a lot of the guys on there have done this stuff, or been involved in the investigations of similar accidents.
Large ships have black boxes, similar to aircraft, and they've already pulled those.
A lot of assumptions being tossed around, which is pointless since very few people know what actually happened, and certainly the RadioReference Marine Engineering & radio Gurus are not on that short list.
I have been scanning the fed bands but haven't heard any traffic related to the US Army Corps of Engineers yet. There is an influx of employees on scene/en route and thought there might be some radio activity.
Do you know if cache radios for CMARC or NCR were distributed? I'd assume that they have FIRST and other interoperability channels are programmed.
No idea. Haven't seen anything RID ranges on FiRST that would suggest that. I haven't monitored CMARC as it usually dead but will add it in.
The only active talkgroup on FiRST now is MD Tac-6. It is used a coordination between marine assets (MDTA, USCG, NRP), air assets (BCoPD & MSP), and coordination with UAS usage.
Marine assets are also using...
CG 112
USCG 121 "Radio Check"
USCG 407
USCG 411 ENC Key up?
Marine 13, 16, 81A, 83A
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